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I. INTRODU(ION
The post-colonial world has retained forms of manipulation, exploita-
tion, and cultural expropriation, even if colonialism itself belongs to
the past.'
Prior to World War II, the world order was divided between states that
were colonized and their colonizers. 2 At the end of the war, most colo-
nies acquired independence.3 However, due to the mass exploitation of
their resources and people during those years, the post war development
1. JORGEN OSTERHAMMEL. COLONIALISM: A TIIoiti- IRCAL OVIt., it x, (Shelley L
Frisch trans., Markus Wiener Publishers 1997) 119 (1995) (emphasis added).
2. See THOMAS SOWELL. CONQUESTS AND CutIiit-s: AN INrIT.\'loU,\ HisioRm
82 (1998). Major European powers. including Britain. Spain and France converted parts of
the less developed world "creating a uniquely European age of overseas imperiahsm, span-
ning the globe." Id. See OSTERHAMMEL. supra note 1. at 6-7. The colonies were some-
times established in sparsely inhabited lands lacking highly integrated native states such as
North America and Africa. See id. However, colonies were also established in lands
where states and civilizations had existed since ancient times, such as in India. See id. at 8.
Additionally, the emigration of "white" colonists often carried an attitude of presumed
superiority over the native populations. See id. at 11. Often termed by the European
powers as "The White Man's Burden." there existed a notion that the developed nations
have a duty to rule Africans. Asians and Aboriginal peoples in order to lead them to a
higher level of culture and civilization. See id. at 16. See also William G. Clarence-Smith.
The Modern Colonial State and Global Economic Integration, 1815-1945. in SiiIs .Xm
SOVEREIGNry IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 120. 129 (David A. Smith et al. eds.. 1999) (not-
ing the danger to the non-white colonies caused by the spread of social Darwinism).
3. The decolonization of Asia. Africa. the Caribbean and South America began
through a post World War II transfer of power. when the Western European colonizing
countries' economies, including the economies of Britain. France. Spain. Portugal and Hol-
land, were extremely depleted due to the war. See OS ITRHtAtMMI t. supra note 1, at 115.
Additionally, anti-imperialist feelings sparked the development of national liberation
movements within many colonized countries. See id. at 116. See also D.K. Fii vitot 'a.
THE WEST AND THE THIRD WORLD 19 (1999) (identifying that decolonization began after
1945). Cf. SOWELL. supra note 2, at 84. 337 (pointing to the fact that in the post World War
If era many Western imperial nations withdrew from their colonies).
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of these former colonies was severely impeded.4 Today, many of these
former colonies comprise those states referred to as developing countries,
while their colonizers are considered the developed or industrialized na-
tions.5 Although developing countries have acquired statehood, they re-
4. See SOWELL, supra note 2, at 82. European colonizing countries established trading
empires in many countries, which they colonized for the purposes of exploiting the miner-
als and resources of those countries. See id. While European imperialism did bring a form
of economic expansion to the colonized countries, it also brought brutal exploitation and
dehumanization at the hands of alien cultures, which held themselves out as being superior
to the native populations. See id. at 82-83. See also FIELDHOUSE, supra note 3, at 3
(describing the motives of colonizing nations, as selfish and for the purpose of acquiring
minerals and crops); OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 1, at 7, 72 (acknowledging that the coloni-
zation of a nation often had a parasitic effect on the dominated economy to the benefit of
the colonizer, through the acquisition of natural resources and human labor). Cf. Lakshmi
Sarma, Note & Comment, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the Formn of Inter-
national Agreements, 13 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 107, 109-10 (1999) (pointing to the fact
that the some countries remain underdeveloped because of the remnants of colonialism).
5. See SOWELL, supra note 2, at 83. Because of its particular suitability to settlement
and exploitation, the colonies of North America, Australia and New Zealand tended to be
more permanent in nature as they established new settlements with transplanted members
of the colonizing state. See id. In addition, North America, like Australia, experienced the
Industrial Revolution at relatively the same time as the colonizing nations. See id. at 67.
See also Clarence-Smith, supra note 2, at 120-21 (establishing that colonies such as Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand were known as Britain's "White Dominions"); FIELDHOUSE,
supra note 3, at 19 (referring to the colonies of white settlement, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand as British Dominions, while most other colonies were viewed as dependen-
cies); OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 1, at 7 (illustrating that North America, Australia and
New Zealand were colonized for permanent settlement purposes). Cf. Evelyn Su, Com-
ment, The Winners and the Losers: The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights and its Effects on Developing Countries, 23 Hous. J. Irrr'iL L. 169, 170 n. 1
(2000) (developing countries are countries whose economies are less advanced than indus-
trialized nations (citing PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL Eco
NOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 240 (2d ed. 1991))). See, e.g., WTOWATCH.org, Fast Fact:
The World Trade Organization (listing the developing countries as designated by the
WTO), at http://www.wtowatch.org/faq/faq.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with au-
thor). Terms that refer to the 'West' and the 'Third World' are terms of art, rather than
exact definitions. See generally FIELDHOUSE, supra note 3, at 1. Synonyms for the West
can include 'industrialized economies' or the 'North' and most often refer to relatively rich
countries, or affluent industrialized states. Id. The Third World, is viewed by some, as the
'Rest,' and in general discourse indicates Latin American, African and Asian countries,
those that are economically less developed than the 'West.' See id. at 2. This grouping of
countries has been alternately referred to as the 'South,' 'less-developed countries' (LDCs)
or developing countries. See id. at 2-3. Throughout this paper the terms referring to devel-
oping and developed countries will be varied. Developed countries may be referred to as
industrialized nations, the north or the west, while developing countries are referred to as
industrializing nations, less-developed countries, third world countries or the south.
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main subject to the demands and control of the industrialized countries in
order to survive in the increasingly global world order.'
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs),7 provides one example of such continued economic and
political dominance by industrialized nations. TRIPs was introduced in
December 1993, during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in order to set minimal international stan-
dards for the protection of intellectual property.9 However, developed
6. Many post-colonization nations entered into a patron-client position of depen-
dence, often on the United States. See OSTERHAMIIILt, supra note 1. at I lb. This new
form of dependence could be attributed to the fact that despite the acquisition of sover-
eignty, most new states were economically unprepared. See id. at 117. The new states were
caught between a choice of self-isolation or a "humble acceptance of peripheral market
opportunities" such as multinational concerns and international economic organtiations.
Id. Thus "[d]ecolonization gave the ex-colonies freedom of action, but seldom the oppor-
tunity to exploit it to full advantage." Id. Former colonies remain subject to a new form of
economic domination based on the economic superiority of stronger national partners. see
id. at 21, such as the United States. The stronger partner maintains dominance due to its
ability to affect multinational concerns, and provide protective military functions, thereby
influencing the politics of the weaker former colonized nations. See id. Today, miany de-
veloping countries assert that their economic development is still in the hands of the devel-
oped countries and has been seriously impacted by unfair trading practices and a lack of
control over international business corporations. See id. See also Su. supra note 5. at 195
(stating that an underlying characteristic of developing countries is that they must play
catch-up with the advanced industrialized countries); Wendy S. Vicente, Comment. A
Questionable Victory for Coerced Argentine Pharmaceutical Patent Legislation. 19 U. P %. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 1101, 1130-31 (1998) (remarking that developing nations are relegated to
dependency upon developed nations). See generally SowVLu. supra note 2. at 331 (noting
that widespread belief exists that "the rich are rich because the poor are poor").
7. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization. Annex IC. Lf
GAL INSTRUMENTS-RESuLTS OF THE URt'(;t'AY ROt'i vol. 31. 33 I.LM. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. See also Implications of Uruguay Round Patent Moves,
MARKETLETTER. May 30. 1994, available at 1194 WL 2620598 [hereinafter Ilnphcativn-s of
Uruguay Round].
8. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, Apr. 15. 1994, LEGAL INSTRuNiEr,,rs-REst1LTS Or 1n-1 URL'AN Rot % i vol.
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (hereinafter Final Act]. GAIT was formally signed on
April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh Morrocco. by representatives from 124 member countries. Id.
at 1131-32 The trade pact opens global markets between member countries for goods and
services and projects a worldwide reduction of tariffs and an increase in annual global
income. Id. at 1127. The Treaty established a successor to GAIT, the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO), which replaced GATT on January 1. 1995. Id.
9. See TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7. See also Margreth Barrett. The Untled States'
Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel Imports of Patented Goods. 27. N. Ky. L Ri '%. 911. 91,
n.22 (2000) (noting that the Uruguay Round of Negotiations on the GAIT introduced
minimum standards for protection of intellectual property rights), Kevin W. McCabe, The
January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPs Agreement. Diverging Views of Developed
and Developing Countries Toward the Patentability of Biotechnology, 6 J. lnI. Pini, L.
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and developing countries differ in approach on how to address intellec-
tual property rights.1" In particular, developing countries have strong in-
centives to under enforce intellectual property laws, while developed
countries reap many benefits from strict enforcement." For developing
countries, signing onto TRIPs was a compromise in exchange for acquir-
ing GATT tariff concessions on goods."l Specifically, under the Uruguay
Round, the developed countries extracted promises of intellectual prop-
erty protection from the developing countries in exchange for lower tar-
iffs on their export goods.13
India is a prominent example of a developing country that has resisted
strong protection of intellectual property rights.14 India, like many devel-
41, 62 (1998) (explaining that TRIPs established minimum standards of intellectual prop-
erty but that a country could implement more extensive protection if desired).
10. McCabe, supra note 9, at 52-53. See Tuan N. Samahon, Note, TRIPs Copyright
Dispute Settlement after the Transition and Moratorium: Nonviolation and Situation Com-
plaints Against Developing Countries, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1051, 1055 (2000). Prior
to the introduction of TRIPs, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) was
the forum of choice for developing countries to discuss intellectual property issues. See id.
Unlike TRIPs, which is included within the WTO system, WIPO focused only on intellec-
tual property rights and did not have a sanctioning method; thus, WIPO provided develop-
ing countries a greater latitude in enforcing obligations relating to intellectual property.
See id. Under the VTO system, intellectual property rights are protected by enforcement
mechanisms and a Dispute Settlement Body [DSB]. See id. at 1057. See also Robert
Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize
Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to
Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1085 (1996) (noting that third
world countries favored WIPO negotiations to revise intellectual property obligations over
their inclusion in the GATT).
11. See McCabe, supra note 9, at 53 (intimating that developing countries view strong
intellectual property protection as only benefiting industrialized countries that export intel-
lectual property).
12. See Robert M. Sherwood, The TRIPs Agreement: Implications for Developing
Countries, 37 IDEA 491, 494 (1997). Sherwood asserts that because the TRIPs Agreement
was the product of multilateral negotiations, the Agreement represents a compromise be-
tween countries' with strongly divergent views regarding the benefit of intellectual prop-
erty for development. Id. See also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, National Obligations Under
Intellectual Property Treaties: The Beginning of a True International Regime, 9 FED. CIR.
B.J. 591, 598 (2000) (discussing the use of linkage-bargain diplomacy in order to secure the
developing countries' acceptance of intellectual property protection within the GAIF ne-
gotiations); Samahon, supra note 10, at 1055 (stating that for developing countries, "acces-
sion to the WTO represented a Faustian bargain: In exchange for present GAT" tariff
concessions on goods, developing countries agreed to adequately protect intellectual prop-
erty in the future").
13. See Mossinghoff, supra note 12, at 598; Samahon, supra note 10, at 1055.
14. See Doris E. Long & Anthony D'Amato, Introduction: A Trip Begins, in INTERNA.
TIONAL INTELLEC-rUAL PROPERTY 7 (Doris Long & Anthony D'Amato eds., 2000) [herein-
after Long & D'Amato, Introduction: A Trip Begins]; Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia,
Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provisions in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India,
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oping countries and humanitarian organizations, has vehemently pro-
tested patent protection for pharmaceuticals." Currently,
pharmaceutical product patents in India are not held to the highest stan-
dards of intellectual property patent protection and are often freely cop-
ied.16 Without highly enforced patents. drugs can be offered at
significantly lower prices. 7 Thus, India's resistance to the implementa-
tion of stringent patent laws for pharmaceuticals has been motivated by a
belief that alleviating the country's health problems should take priority
over foreign corporations' rights to derive profits by maintaining a mo-
nopoly on a particular invention."8
India's commitment to improving the health of its people is shared by
many developing countries and is recognized as a priority by the World
29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507 (1996): David K. Tomar. Note & Comment. 4 Look into
the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Between the Untted States and India, 17 Wi's i. 't
L.J. 579, 579 (1999). See also Anthony D'Amato & Doris E. Long. Asia and the Protection
of Intellectual Property, in INTERNATIONAL INTELI(VtLat PRoiiRry L-\% 296 (Anthony
D'Amato & Doris Long eds.. 1997) [hereinafter D'Amato & Long, Asia and the Protection
of Intellectual Property] (explaining that many Indians regard the imposition of intellectual
property as economic colonialism). Cf. Robert Evans. WTO Chef to Visit India on Trade
Round Effort (Jan. 5. 2000) (stating that India. which is arguably one of the world's most
influential trading states, is widely seen as a major player in determining the position of
developing countries on trade issues), at http://www.wtow%'atch.org/news./index.cfm (last v'is-
ited May 15. 2001) (on file with author).
15. See Long & D'Amato. Introduction: A Trip Begins. supra note 14, at 7; Adelman
& Baldia, supra note 14. at 525-27. One well recognized humanitarian organization,
M~decins Sans Frontiers, or Doctors Without Borders. has undertaken a campaign to en-
sure access to essential medicines. particularly for the most common global infectious dis-
eases found predominately in developing countries. See Mi6decins Sans Frontiers.
Campaign of Access to Essential Medicines. at http://\%%vw.msf.org/advocacy/accessmed/
(last visited Feb. 26. 2001) (on file with author).
16. See David Hurlbutt, Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol
for Related Intellectual Property. 34 NAl. Rrs tiOt s J. 379 (l941. excerpt reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLEC-UAL PROIIER'rY LA'% 37 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Long
eds., 1997). See generally Adelman & Baldia. supra note 14. at 507 (condemning the Indian
pharmaceutical industry for 'free-rid[ing]' on the intellectual property developments of
other countries).
17. See Hurlbutt. supra note 16. at 37 (noting that drugs are available in India for as
little as seven to twenty percent of the cost of comparable drugs in the United States).
18. See Long & D'Amato, Introduction: A Trip Begins. supra note 14. at 7 (comment-
ing on the Indian position that patent protection for essential pharmaceuticals would place
them beyond the reach of the Indian people)- Hurlbuit. supra note 16. at 37 (relating the
idea that a patent creates a monopoly by the person holding the patent by preventing
anyone else from duplicating and selling it at a lower rate). See also Immanuel Wallersten.
States? Sovereignty? The Dilenmnas of Capitalists in an Age of Transition, In SI AII-', -ND
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE GLOBAL ECONONiY 20. 25 (David A. Smith et al. eds.. 1999) (con-
demning the fact that while many free market states forbid monopolies, it appears that
"[bly re-labeling such monopolies 'intellectual property.' the hope is that no one will notice
how incompatible this notion is with the concept of a free market").
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Health Organization (WHO).1 9 Additionally, in the 1948 adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations recognized
that all people have a right to adequate health and well being, including
medical care.20 Unfortunately, despite a recognized commitment to
healthcare, a significant aspect of the economic gap between developed
and developing countries is evidenced by the large disparity between
health conditions in rich and poor countries.21 This is especially daunting
considering that the process of globalization appears to be increasing,
rather than narrowing the health gap.22
19. Constitution of the World Health Organization, preamble, opened for signature
July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185 (providing that enjoyment of the highest at-
tainable standard of health is a fundamental human right of every human being). See
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999: MAKING A DIF-
FERENCE 13 (1999) [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999] (noting that reducing the
burden of inequality in health is a priority in international health). See also David P.
Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health in the Develop-
ing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 191 (1999).
20. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RiGHs, art. 25(1). Article 25 states
"[E]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food ... and medical care ... and the right to security
in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability .... " Id.
21. See WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999, supra note 19, at 20, 22 (noting that in devel-
oping countries infectious diseases are the major cause of premature death). See also
Fidler, supra note 19, at 191, 194. Fidler argues that this economic gap is of particular
concern as populations in developing countries face continued threats from infectious dis-
eases in addition to growing epidemics of non-communicable diseases. See id. While indus-
trialized countries have had tremendous breakthroughs in handling infectious diseases
through effective vaccines and antibiotics, developing regions have not experienced the
same health transition. Id. The infectious disease problem in developing countries is wors-
ening, as indicated by the dramatic spread of HIV/AIDS, the development of anti-micro-
bial resistance to malaria, pneumonia, tuberculosis, and the continued illness and death
brought on by water borne diseases such as cholera. Id. at 195. UNAIDS estimates that
over 95% of all persons infected with HIV live in the developing world. See id. at 195 n. 13
(citing UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update, Dec. 1998, at 2 (1998)).
22. World Health Assembly, Strengthening Health Systems in Developing Countries,
WHA 52.23, May 25, 1999 [hereinafter WHA 52.23, Strengthening Health], available at
http:/lwww.who.intlwha-1998/WHA99PDF991e-reso.pdf. (on file with author). In this re-
port the WHO stated it was:
[m]indful of the fact that globalization presents opportunities and challenges for all
countries and that developing countries, especially the poorest, are vulnerable to those
adverse effects of globalization which lead to greater inequities in health and health
care both within such countries and between developed and developing countries.
Id. See also Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Report to the National AIDS Committee of Thai-
land, (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Report to Thailand] (noting that
developing countries are merely passive recipients of the effects of globalization rather
than its beneficiaries), available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org (on file with author). See
Fidler, supra note 19, for a detailed discussion of the health-globalization relationship. The
process of globalization is broad and encompasses increased international business corpo-
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The Indian population exceeds one billion people. 3 The majority of
this population lives below the poverty line.24 Due to this mass poverty, a
primary concern for the Indian government is that patent protection
would result in an inevitable increase in the price of medicine. '  Such
price increases would make prescription drugs unaffordable and there-
fore unavailable to those who are most in need.2' If the majority of the
population is unable to gain access to essential medicines because of price
increases caused by stringent patent protection, the fear that millions of
people could die becomes more of a reality.
It is evident that the TRIPs Agreement, in its current form, acts as a
vehicle for Western imperialism over developing countries.27 This impe-
rialism was evidenced by the use of the GATT/WTO forum by developed
countries to implement the TRIPs agreement, thereby imposing
mandatory protection of intellectual property rights.' Additionally, this
rations as well as international legal structures such as the World Trade Organization. See
id. at 192. Globalization is a process dominated by market influences, which have had a
negative impact on public health in developing countries. Id. The focus of this paper will
be the effect of TRIPs patent provisions on the health needs of developing countries, in the
new globalized world order.
23. See Office of the Registrar General of India, Census of India. Population Clock,
(stating that the population of India on March 1. 2001 was 1,012,395,934). available at http:1
/www.censusindia.netlpclock.html (last visited March 24, 2001) (on file with author).
24. See Hurlbutt, supra note 16. at 37.
25. Cf. Suresh Koshy, Note. The Effect of TRIPs on Indian Patent Law: A Pharnaceu-
tical Industry Perspective, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 4, para. 1 (1995) (noting that India
maintains weak patent laws to provide inexpensive products to its citizens).
26. See George K. Foster, Comment. Opposing Forces in a Revoltion in International
Patent Protection: The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AnF. 283, 309 (1998).
27. See Marcia A Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Over-
protective, 29 V D. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996) (denouncing the TRIPs as -old-fash-
ioned, Western-style imperialism"), excerpt reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INTEL.tEcruAL
PROPERTY 361, 362 (Doris Long & Anthony D'Amato eds., 2000); Sarma, supra note 4, at
125 (dismissing the GATT/TRIPs agreement as simply a form of modern-day colonialism
disregarding the differing needs of the lesser developed nations): Michael W. Smith. Note,
Bringing Developing Countries' Intellectual Property Laws to TRIPs Standards: Hurdles
and Pitfalls Facing Vietnam 's Efforts to Normalize an Intellectual Property Regime, 31 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 211. 227 (1999) (noting that there are many who view the TRIPs as a
vehicle of Western imperialism). See also Roger Cohen, The World Trade Agreement. The
Overview; GATT Talks End in Joy and Relief, N.Y. Ti.tEs, Dec. 16, 1993, at DI (indicating
that many Indian legislators denounced the signing of the Agreement as the sale of the
country to American Imperialists).
28. See Fidler. supra note 19, at 209. The developed countries were led by the United
States. Id. In order for developing countries to receive the trade benefits available
through membership in the WTO, the member states were required to accept the obliga-
tions of intellectual property through TRIPs. See id. See also Hamilton. supra note 27, at
362.
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imperialism is also evidenced by the United States' unilateral action of
sanctioning countries, which fail to provide the desired level of intellec-
tual property protection. The provisions that would support developing
countries are under-enforced, while those that benefit the industrialized
developed countries are over-enforced. 9 Considering that there is no
guaranteed access to essential drugs for one-third of the world's popula-
tion, the opposition to the implementation of intellectual property pro-
tection of pharmaceutical patents must not be ignored.3"
This comment explores India's resistance to strong intellectual prop-
erty protection in the area of pharmaceutical patents. This resistance re-
flects concerns felt by many developing countries. 3' Section II begins
with a brief overview of the nature of intellectual property as it relates to
patents, and examines the diverging views held by developing and indus-
trialized nations. Section III reviews the Uruguay Round of GATT and
the implementation of TRIPs. This section also compares the competing
perspectives of the industrialized and developing nations, about TRIPs,
as evidenced by the current positions of the United States and India, re-
spectively. An analysis of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism will
also be undertaken.
Section IV presents a brief review of the history and current state of
India's patent regime. Section V presents the cases for and against a
strong intellectual property regime for pharmaceutical patents in devel-
oping countries, such as India. Section V also includes an overview of the
29. See M~decins Sans Fronti~res, Report to Thailand, supra note 22 (noting that sev-
eral developing countries have been pressured by Western governments to change trade
laws that would restrict their ability to produce or import drugs).
30. World Health Assembly. Revised Drug Strategy, WHA 52.19, May 24, 1999 [here-
inafter WHA 52.19, Revised Drug Strategy], available at http://www.who.int/wha-1998/
WHA99/PDF99/e-reso.pdf. (on file with author). In her first major policy speech, the Di-
rector-General stated that never before have so many been denied access to health. See
Press Release, World Health Organization, Director-General Sets out WHO Stance on
Health and Human Rights (Dec. 8, 1998) (on file with author). She also noted that the
developing countries carry ninety percent of the disease burden, but only have access to
ten percent of health resources. Id. See also Press Release, World Health Organization,
WTO to Address Trade and Pharmaceuticals (May 22, 1999) (on file with author) (ac-
knowledging that in the most impoverished parts of Asia and Africa the proportion of the
population which is deprived access to essential drugs rises from one-third to one-half).
See generally Fidler, supra note 19, at 210 (asserting that the TRIPs Agreement will cause a
further reduction of access to essential drugs constituting a public health concern for devel-
oping countries).
31. See generally Weissman, supra note 10, at 1085 (examining the concerns of Third
World countries in the implementation of pharmaceutical patents); Smith, supra note 27, at
211 (commenting on Vietnam's struggles over adopting Western imposed intellectual prop-
erty laws); Vicente, supra note 6 (discussing Argentina's resistance to the imposition of
patent protection on pharmaceuticals).
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nature of pharmaceutical patents, and the differing viewpoints supporting
or contesting enhanced intellectual property rights as it applies to phar-
maceutical patents. In addition, an examination of the recent events in
Pretoria, South Africa, and their implications, will be undertaken.
The approaching January 1. 2005 deadline for developing countries to
comply with the TRIPs agreement.3 2 will be discussed in Section VI. Ad-
ditionally, section VI proposes alternative methods of interpreting TRIPs
and methods for dealing with the United States' heavy-handed attitude
towards developing countries. Section VI also asserts that developing
countries, including India, as sovereign nations, should have the right to
determine their patent policies in accordance with the health concerns of
their people.
33
The imposition of universal standards of patent protection under
TRIPs in its current form cannot be justified. Anti-competitive intellec-
tual property rights of industrialized nations, led by United States author-
ities, provide more benefits to the developed world than to developing
countries. Such a high level of protection, particularly as it pertains to
medical needs, is neither necessary nor fair.
32. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7. art. 65. Article 65 provides for the transitional
arrangements for countries to apply the provisions of the TRIPs. See id. All members are
given one year, subsequent to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, to
implement the TRIPs Agreement. Id. art. 65(1). Developing countries are entitled to de-
lay an additional four years before implementing the Agreement. hI. art. 65(2). Addition-
ally, a developing country that is required to extend product patent protection to areas of
technology that were previously unprotected. is entitled to delay the application in the area
of product patents for an additional period of five years. Id. art. 65(4). Thus for develop-
ing countries which did not previously require product patents for pharmaceuticals. includ-
ing India, Article 65 provides a ten year transitional period. See id. art. 65. Least
developed countries were automatically given a ten-year transition period and can request
an extension from the Council of TRIPs. See id. art. 66. See also Inphcattom of Uruguay
Round, supra note 7 (explaining that a special transitional arrangement was pro~ided for
developing countries that had not previously provided product protection. such as in the
pharmaceutical arena): M.A. Kamal. Role of WTO in Shaping a Balanced Global Econ-
omy, THE INDEPENDENr,. Aug. 26. 1999 (distinguishing that while developed countries
were required to meet the obligations of TRIPs by 1996. developing countnes. which had
not previously provided protection to pharmaceuticals. have been given until January 2U06
to implement the measurements), available at 1999 WL 21950370.
33. This view is supported by the WHO as noted in a meeting of the World Health
Assembly. See WHA 52.23, Strengthening Health. supra note 22. The 52nd World Health
Assembly explicitly acknowledges "the sovereign right of each country to adopt national
policies appropriate to the specific needs of its people." IM.
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II. ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
A. What Is Intellectual Property?
Intellectual property can be defined as a "property right in an intangi-
ble asset-a right in the 'product of the mind.'" 34 An example of an in-
tellectual property right, and the focus of this paper, is a patent.35 A
patent provides a grant to an inventor of the exclusive use or sale of an
invention, thus acting as an incentive for the inventor to work on devel-
oping new inventions.36 A patent represents a monetary reward to an
inventor by legally excluding those seeking to make, use or sell the inven-
tor's product without permission, thus ensuring maximum profits.37
However, a patent can also be seen as granting a monopoly to the
holder,38 and thus the reward presents the danger of legally sanctioned
34. Doris E. Long & Anthony D'Amato, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 12 (Doris Long & Anthony D'Amato eds., 2000) [hereinafter Long &
D'Amato, Introduction]. See also Smith, supra note 27, at 212. 215 (indicating that intellec-
tual property encompasses property status bestowed on expressions, ideas, inventions and
creations).
35. Intellectual property has five basic forms: copyright, patent, trademark, trade
secrets, and industrial design. See Anthony D'Amato & Doris E. Long, Introduction, in
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Long eds.,
1997) [hereinafter D'Amato & Long, Introduction]. For the purpose of this comment I will
focus specifically on patents. To be patentable, an invention must be new, useful and non-
obvious. Id. at 3. A patent is essentially an exclusive monopoly which the government
grants to inventors for a limited time period. See id. at 4. Patents are obtained by filing an
application with the country's patent office and completing various forms as required by
the specific Patent Act of the country. See id. When an inventor tries to obtain a patent
the inventor is trying to gain exclusive rights over the invention, preventing others from
imitating the invention and earning profit. See id. The purpose behind granting an inven-
tor a limited monopoly, in the form of a patent, is to encourage further innovation thereby
promoting the progress of science. See Barrett, supra note 9, at 921. By allowing this type
of monopoly, the inventors' investment in research and development can be recouped and
the inventor is provided with an incentive or a reward to continue with new developments
or inventions. See id. It is construed as being in the best interest of a government to
encourage inventors to file for patents as such actions stimulate and contribute to the coun-
try's economic, industrial and technological development. See id. Patents are normally
limited to a specific term as defined by a country's patent act. See D'Amato & Long, Intro-
duction, supra at 4. Currently under TRIPs, the patent term has been extended to a period
of 20 years. Developed countries viewed this extended term as a substantial accomplish-
ment, while developing countries considered it a loss as they generally prefer short patent
terms. See id.
36. See Doris E. Long & Anthony D'Amato, Patents: An Overview, in INTERNA-
TIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 45 (Doris Long & Anthony D'Amato eds., 2000) [here-
inafter Long & D'Amato, Patents: An Overview].
37. See D'Amato & Long, Introduction, supra note 35, at 1.
38. Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv.
450 (1969), excerpt reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 196 (Doris
Long & Anthony D'Amato eds., 2000). Cf. John M. Wechkin. Comment, Drug Price Regu-
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price gouging, allowing for extreme prices, well above the cost of
production. 39
B. Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Nations Toward
Intellectual Property Rights
Broad discrepancies exist between developed and developing countries
in determining the value that should be given to intellectual property pro-
tection.no The main reason for this discrepancy is the perceived bifur-
cated impact of such protection.4 Inventors in industrialized nations
advocate for strong intellectual property protection. They assert that this
protection serves as an incentive for future research and development,
allows for recovery of costs, and prevents developing countries from "'free
riding" on the invention.42
lation and Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents: Tie New Zealand Connec-
tion, 5 PAc. Rim L. & PoL'Y J. 237. 237 (1995) (explaining that some claim that patents
grant a monopoly power which results in higher prices for patented products and in the
area of pharmaceuticals leads to a reduction of availability of essential medicines).
39. See Hurlbutt, supra note 16, at 37. Cf. Adelman & Baldia. supra note 14. at 510
("IT]he patent system does not simply generate winners, it also generates losers: those who
pay monopoly prices for products that for one reason or another would have been invented
in the absence of a patent system.").
40. Long & D'Amato, Introduction. supra note 34. at 10. See Anthony D'Amato &
Doris E. Long, Common Heritage of Mankind, in IN'-MRArIoNAL Is'iTuiAc-t'At, PROP.
ERTY LAW 61 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Long eds.. 1997) [hereinafter D'Amato &
Long, Common Heritage of Mankind]: Kirsten Peterson. Recent Development. Recent In-
tellectual Property Trends in Developing Countries. 33 HAR\'. INT'L U. 277. 277 (1992).
Cf. Sarma, supra note 4. at 117 (asserting that "developed countries have a eurocentric,
individualistic understanding of property" that fails to appreciate the distinct community
understanding of property found in developing countries).
41. Industrialized countries are perceived as possessing the majority of inventors and
creators of intellectual property. See Long & D'Amato. Introduction. supra note 34, at 11.
These countries advocate for enhanced protection and assert that the unauthorized use of
intellectual property will cause serious financial loss as inventors will be unable to recover
their research and development costs. Id. However, developing countries, which possess
scarce economic resources, argue that intellectual property is merely a means to exploit
and dominate poor countries. See id. See also Peterson. supra note 40 (noting the dtstinc-
tion in views between developing and developed countries).
42. See Long & D'Amato. Introduction. supra note 34. at 11. Alan S. Gutterman. The
North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. 28 WAKE
FORFST L. REV. 89, 92 (1993): McCabe. supra note 9. at 56. See generally Adelman &
Baldia, supra note 14, at 508. Free riding occurs when a country copies patented technol-
ogy or products from another country. See id. at 510. This can occur when a country
adopts weak patent protection. Id. In the pharmaceutical industry', the wealthy industrial-
ized countries pay for the development of new medicines, while many other countries do
not participate in that innovative process. See id. India provides an example of a country
that has allowed the cost of research and development of pharmaceuticals to fall on the
developed world. See id. at 511. See also Peterson, supra note 40. at 279 (explaining that
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Developing countries view the appropriation of knowledge as unfair
and detrimental to the development of those nations.4 3 Many argue that
knowledge should be treated as the common heritage of mankind and
made available to all." This is particularly true in regards to patents.
The governments of many developing countries have resisted providing
full patent protection to inventions or enforcing patent provisions that
have previously been enacted.45 They assert that they will receive mini-
mal benefits through an extension of protection, and that it is the devel-
oped countries that will accrue the maximum benefits. 46 Additionally,
developing countries view the imposition of intellectual property protec-
tion as an exercise of foreign control, diminishing their sovereign rights.47
In consideration of their limited resources, developing countries feel the
imposition of strong intellectual property rights will inhibit their own
ability to gain access to new technologies in pursuit of economic growth
and competitiveness.48 Therefore, these nations resist industrialized
countries' demands for implementation and enforcement of such laws.
C. Intellectual Property Law Favors the Have Nations
Prior to the Uruguay Round, many developing countries, led by India,
argued that GATT was an inappropriate forum to discuss the develop-
ment of enhanced intellectual property protection.49 Developing coun-
for developed nations, who are perceived as possessing the majority of creators and inven-
tors of intellectual property, the unauthorized use of intellectual property represents a fi-
nancial loss). But see Barrett, supra note 9, at 913 (remarking that even in the United
States free riding is not seen as inherently undesirable; if facilitated under the law it can be
beneficial to the public provided it does not seriously interfere with the incentive to invest
in research and development).
43. See Long & D'Amato, Introduction, supra note 34, at 11; Sarma, supra note 4. at
118.
44. See D'Amato & Long, Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 40, at 61; Long
& D'Amato, Introduction, supra note 34, at 11.
45. See Gutterman, supra note 42, at 92; Peterson, supra note 40, at 279.
46. See Gutterman, supra note 42, at 92.
47. See Long & D'Amato, Introduction, supra note 34, at 11; Gutterman, supra note
42, at 92; Peterson, supra note 40, at 279-80. See also Smith, supra note 27, at 231 (noting
that TRIPs, through the imposition of strong intellectual property rights in developing
countries, is potentially problematic as it encourages an economic dependence on industri-
alized countries).
48. See D'Amato & Long, Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 40, at 61; Gut-
terman, supra note 42, at 104. See also Sarma, supra note 4, at 127 (stating that TRIPs
detracts from developing countries ability to attain self-sufficiency).
49. See Doris E. Long & Anthony D'Amato, Does Intellectual Property Favor the
"Have" Nations?, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 134 (Doris Long &
Anthony D'Amato eds., 2000) [hereinafter Long & D'Amato, Does Intellectual Property
Favor the "Have" Nations?]. See also Doris E. Long, Copyright and the Uruguay Round
Agreements: A New Era of Protection or an Illusory Promise?, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 531, 537, 543
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tries were reluctant to address intellectual property protection through
the GATT, which was viewed as representing the demands of the more
powerful "have" nations.50 Arguably, ensuring access to international
trade is more important to developing countries because of their distinct
need for economic growth.5 Thus, many developing countries were con-
cerned that their needs would not be given sufficient consideration. 2
The United States, undoubtedly the biggest proponent of TRIPs, em-
phasized that the trade concessions, which give developing countries
greater access to the markets of industrialized countries, are 'quid pro
quo' in exchange for enhanced intellectual property laws." For develop-
ing countries, this trade-off is potentially dangerous to their well being.
At the heart of the debate are the changes to current intellectual property
patent law, particularly as it relates to pharmaceutical patents.
Developing countries often make the argument that the sale and manu
facture of patented goods does not harm an intellectual property owner.
(1994) (providing that India and Brazil contested the insertion of an intellectual property
agreement into GATT), Sarma, supra note 4. at 129 (mentioning India's protests against
TRIPs).
50. Long & D'Amato. Does Intellectual Property Favor the "Have" Nations?. supra
note 49, at 134. See D'Amato & Long, Introduction. supra note 35. at 2. The -have" na-
tions, are synonymous with rich, developed, industrialized countries and are perceived as
those countries who generated a substantial proportion of the inventions, /i. The have-
nots are synonymous with countries that do not generate an equivalent amount of intellec-
tual property. Id. See also Long, supra note 49. at 533. 544 (describing the fundamental
conflict between developed and developing countries or the technological haves and tech-
nological have-nots in the GAIT).
51. See The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) to the House of
Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. lssues of Con-
cern to Canada at Future WTO Negotiations (April 21. 1999) (prepared by Rohinton
Medhora, Senior Specialist), available at http://www.idrc.ca/tec/"tohoce.html (on file with
author).
52. See id
53. See Mossinghoff, supra note 12. at 598 (intimating that the United States engaged
in 'linkage-bargain diplomacy' by trading off the GAT" multilateral trade negotiations in
exchange for increased intellectual property protection); J.H. Reichman, Conpiance wtll
the TRIPS Agreement Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TR.,SN.,, t I.L 363,
374 (1996) (asserting that even if developing countries relinquished more on intellectual
property issues they obtained more in trade provisions). Cf. Shervood. supra note 12. at
493 ("[I]n recent years, the issue of intellectual property protection has been 'married' to
international trade").
54. Long & D'Amato. Does Intellectual Property Favor the "'Have" Nanons?, supra
note 49, at 135-36: Frederick M. Abbott. Protecting First World Assets in tite Third World
Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framneivork. 22 V-.%i,. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989). excerpt reprinted in Irml ,NAIoNAt l.i ts -r'.. PROt Rfl
LAw 11 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Long eds.. 1997). Since intellectual property is intan-
gible, it can be reproduced and used without actually depriving the inventor of the use or
possession of the invention. Id. The demand for the protection of intellectual property
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This is due to the fact that the patent holder is not prevented from mak-
ing or selling any amount of lawful copies." No real harm is done when a
purchaser buys an unlawful version of a good, which would be priced
below the market value, as they would never have been able to afford the
legitimate version." In light of these considerations, the developing
countries' dedication to facilitate their economic growth and indepen-
dence is inhibited by the over-enforcement of intellectual property laws,
which favor the "have" nations.57
III. THE IMPACT OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
A. The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and the TRIPs Agreement
During the period leading up to the Uruguay Round of GATT, many
industries dependent on intellectual property protection, including the
United States pharmaceutical industry,58 began to promote the idea that
the GATT negotiations would be an ideal opportunity to gain protection
on an international level.59 By inserting an intellectual property agree-
ment into the GATT, developing nations dependent on the trade conces-
sions would be forced to change their laws to align with those of the
developed countries.6"
rights is based on the idea that such property naturally belongs to the person who created
it. See id. The use of intellectual property without compensating the natural owner, is
viewed by developed countries as wrong. Id.
55. See Long & D'Amato, Does Intellectual Property Favor the "Have" Nations?,
supra note 49. at 135-36.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Gutterman, supra note 42, at 108. The United States pharmaceutical industry
has been a large factor in placing intellectual property onto the free trade agenda. See
Weissman, supra note 10, at 1069. Amongst the world's largest pharmaceutical companies,
are Merck, Pfizer, Glaxo Smith Kline, and Eli Lily. See Larry Elliott, Putting Profit Before
People, THE CANBERRA TIMES, Feb. 19, 2001, at All.
59. See Gutterman, supra note 42, at 108; Mossinghoff, supra note 12, at 598. During
the Uruguay round of trade talks the large pharmaceutical companies used their financial
muscle and political leverage to lobby for increasing intellectual property patent protec-
tion. See Elliott, supra note 58, at All. Cf. Weissman, supra note 10, at 1069 (discussing
intellectual property in broad terms).
60. See Mossinghoff. supra note 12, at 598 (intimating that linkage-bargain diplomacy
assured that the intellectual property protection would be incorporated within the GA'T
multilateral trade negotiations to achieve an agreement that would otherwise be elusive);
Weissman, supra note 10, at 1084-85 (discussing the need for developing countries to make
intellectual property sacrifices in order to attain the benefits of GATT).
[Vol. 3:339
20011 EXAMINATION OF THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 355
B. The United States as the Primary Supporter of TRIPs
Developed nations, led by the United States, rallied for the inclusion of
TRIPs in the Uruguay Round.6 By including TRIPs in the Final Agree-
ment, the United States admittedly "created a set of standards enforcea-
ble between governments and subject not only to our own trade laws but
to multilateral rules."62
The United States points to its own domestic legislation as a basis for
demanding strong intellectual property rights, particularly in the area of
patent protection.63 The United States' Patent Act provides that for an
invention to be patented, it must be novel.' 4 non-obvious"' and have util-
ity.66 Once these requirements are met, the government grants a patent
on behalf of the United States by the Patent and Trademark Office."7
Although a patent is intangible, it possesses the attributes of personal
property and may be sold or licensed to a prospective user.'" The patent
is not to be infringed upon during the patent's term. At the end of the
patent's term, the exclusive rights are extinguished and the owner of the
right, under the patent, can no longer protect the invention."' The
61. See The United States Trade Representative. The Work o' f th USTR-Intelltctual
Property, at www.ustr.gov/sectors/swtwork.shtml (last visited Feb. 26. 2001) (on file with
author). The U.S. House of Representatives approved the GA1T legislation on November
29, 1994 and the Senate ratified the accord on December 1. 1994. See ti. President Clinton
signed the bill on December 8. 1994. Id. Because of U.S. concerns that some future deci-
sions by the organization may be unacceptable under U.S. laws. a prosision in the treaty
allows any member to withdraw from the WVTO six months after giving notice See tl See
Mossinghoff, supra note 12, at 598.
62. The United States Trade Representative. The Work oftht USTR-Inell'ctual Prop-
erty, supra note 61.
63. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8. cl. 8. The clause states the Constitution grants Congress
the authority to enact legislation: "[tlo promote the progress of [science] by securing for
limited [tlimes to.. .inventors the exclusive fright] to their ... .dliscoveries." Id. This clause
is often termed the Patent Clause of the Constitution. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank. 527 U.S. 627. 635 (1999). AdditionallN. the
United States Patent Act has been codified in Title 35 of the United States ('ode. See 35
U.S.C. §1-376 (1994). See also Mossinghoff. supra note 12. at 592 (noting that in 1954.
Congress codified the U.S. patent statute in Title 35 of the U.S. Code),
64. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101. 102 (1994).
65. See id. § 103.
66. See id. § 101.
67. See id § 153.
68. See id. § 261. See also Alan M. Fisch. Note. Cotnpulsors, Liceniz.g of Pharmtnceu,
tical Patents: An Unreasonable Sohtion to an Unfortunate Problen. 34 Jt Rtiu tizc x. J. 295,
300 (1994). A patent holder is able to sell or license their patent and upon doing so wsaives
any property rights in the patent. See id. A compulsory license, allows a person other than
the patent holder to manufacture, sell or use the patented invention for a reasonable rate
as established by the government. See id.
69. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
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United States pharmaceutical industry may hold a patent until it expires,
at which time generic producers can sell copies of the drug without the
authority of or payment to the patent owner.7" Considering the power
and magnitude of the United States' pharmaceutical industry, the fact
that the government has fought for the inclusion of strong intellectual
property protection in its domestic laws is not surprising.71
1. Special 301
Historically, the United States has unilaterally imposed coercive mea-
sures in order to pressure countries to comply with its intellectual prop-
erty demands. The most utilized measure was implemented in 1988 with
the addition of section 182 to the Omnibus Trade Act of 1974,72 com-
monly referred to as "Special 301." 73 This initiative of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) provides for an annual Special 301 review
mandated by Congress.74 The 1988 Trade Act provides that the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights is essential for the United States to be
internationally competitive.75 In light of this consideration, Special 301
permits the United States to intercede directly in countries where piracy
is viewed as prevalent or where a government is considered exceptionally
tolerant of piracy.76 Special 301 provides that the United States, through
the USTR may identify and investigate foreign countries that fail to en-
sure appropriate protection for the intellectual property rights of the
United States and to press any country who fails to provide adequate
protection through the threat of trade sanctions.77 Special 301 gives the
70. See Fisch, supra note 68, at 299-300. See also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994) (estab-
lishing a 20 year term for a patent).
71. See Fisch, supra note 68, at 299-300.
72. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1301,
1303, 102 Stat. 1107,1164-76, 1179-81 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
19 U.S.C. 2411-19) [hereinafter 1988 Omnibus Trade Act] (amending the Trade Act of
1974. Pub. L. No. 93-316, §§ 302(b), 182 (1974)).
73. See id.; Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, "Special 301 ". Its Requirements, Inple-
mentation and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259, 259 (1990); Weissman, supra note
10, at 1078.
74. 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 72. See The United States Trade Representa-
tive, The Work of the USTR-Intellectual Property, supra note 61.
75. See 1988 Omnibus Trade Act, supra note 72, §1303(a)(1)(A) 102 Stat. at 1179:
Bello & Holmer, supra note 73, at 260-61.
76. See The United States Trade Representative, The Work of the USTR-Intellectual
Property, supra note 61.
77. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR An-
nounces Results of Special 301 Out-of-Cycle Reviews (Nov. 8, 2000), available at
www.ustr.gov (on file with author); The United States Trade Representative, The Work of
the USTR-Intellectual Property, supra note 61. See 19 U.S.C §2411 (c) (as amended by
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4938, Dec. 8, 1994. See also Weissman, supra note 10, at 1078
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USTR the right to determine if a country through its actions, policies or
practice do not measure up to United States standards of intellectual
property, which might restrict persons or corporations of the United
States from gaining access to their markets.7" Countries deemed Priority
Foreign Countries (PFCs), are often investigated as the United States
feels they create the greatest potential for an adverse impact on United
States products because of their practices and policies which prevent in-
tellectual property protection.79
Particularly disturbing is the fact that the United States is allowed to
make these determinations on its own, without any oversight. The
United States, however, views such measures as greatly improving intel-
lectual property standards around the world.'
In the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Special 301 was amended to
clarify that even a country in compliance with the obligations of the
TRIPs Agreement can be found to deny effective and adequate intellec-
tual property protection." Clearly, this should be viewed as an example
of United States unilateralism. Through Special 301, the United States
uses the credible threat of unilateral retaliation to ensure that countries
comply with its intellectual property regime.' Such unilateral action has
no place in the global arena. GATT members, particularly the develop-
ing countries, have complained that the United States' use of Special 301,
"violates the spirit, if not the letter, of GATF.""3 The United States has
(pointing out that some speculate that the USTR has focused its attention on countmes
such as India and Brazil because of their role in advancing the developing countries' de-
mands in the Uruguay round of negotiations).
78. See Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974: Re-
quest for Public Comment, 66 Fed. Reg. 10.3640 (Jan. 16, 2001), Press Release. Office of
the United States Trade Representative. USTR Announces Results of Special 301 Out-of-
Cycle Reviews. supra note 77. See also Bello & Holmer, supra note 73. at 261.
79. See Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974: Re-
quest for Public Comment, 66 Fed. Reg. 10.3640 (Jan. 16. 2001) (noting that it is the re-
sponsibility of the USTR to determine PFC's who will be subject to investigation).
80. See The United States Trade Representative. The Work of the USTR-Intelh-ciual
Property, supra note 61.
81. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative. USTR An-
nounces Results of Special 301 Out-of-Cycle Reviews. supra note 77.
82. See Bello & Holmer. supra note 73. at 259. See also Weissman, supra note 10. at
1079 (recognizing that the main target of USTR sanctions have been third world countmes
with developing pharmaceutical industries such as India. Argentina, Brazil. Taiwan and
Thailand).
83. Robert J. Pechman, Note, Seeking Multilateral Protection for Intellectual Propert:
The United States "TRIPS" Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL rRAt)t _ 179, 199 (1998).
See also Jack Egan, Eaton Vance Greater India. U.S. NEws (Jan. 24, 2000). available at
wysivyg:ll149/http:llwww.usnews.comiusnewslissue/000124/nycuifund5.htm (last visited
Sept. 30, 2000) (on file with author). Developing Nations have expressed concerns that the
WTO may be becoming an agent of the U.S. and developed countries. See id. India's
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no right to act as enforcement police to developing countries; despite its
continuing policies to the contrary. This is particularly true as the USTR
focus encompasses whether countries are in compliance with their WTO
TRIPs obligations. 4
While developed countries argue that a strong intellectual property sys-
tem acts to the advantage of a country, such an argument fails to take into
account the different needs of poorer, developing nations.8 5 Although
the United States sought and achieved a dispute settlement mechanism to
secure compliance, 6 it has continued to use Special 301 to impose unilat-
eral sanctions against countries.
In late April of 2000, the USTR released its annual report identifying
foreign countries, which deny adequate and effective intellectual property
rights.8 7 Fifty-nine countries were identified as intellectual property
evaders.88 Sixteen of those countries, including India, were placed on the
Priority Watch List.89 Due to complaints against such unilateral action,
extreme pressure has been placed on the United States, which has taken
small measures to appear to respond to developing countries' concerns.9"
In the face of current AIDS controversy in South Africa, the large phar-
maceutical companies and the United States government found it neces-
sary to do some image control.91 In May 2000, President Clinton signed
Commerce and Industry Minister has warned developing nations to resist moves by devel-
oped nations that threaten sanctions to reduce the competitiveness of the developing na-
tions. See id.
84. Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974: Request
for Public Comment, 66 Fed. Reg. 10,3640 (Jan. 16, 2001).
85. See Fidler, supra note 19.
86. See America and the World Trade Organization, United States Trade Representa-
tive, 6 (1998), available at www.ustr.gov. (on file with author).
87. See Identification of Countries that Deny Adequate Protection, or Market Access
for Intellectual Property Rights Under Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974, 65 Fed. Reg.
89,26652 (May 8, 2000).
88. Id.
89. The countries placed on the watch list were Argentina, the Dominican Republic,
Egypt, the European Union, Greece, Guatemala, India, Israel, Italy, Korea, Malaysia,
Peru, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. See id. Other countries were placed on the
Watch List, or the Potential Priority Foreign Country list. See id. In this report the USTR
announced that it would also initiate WTO dispute settlement cases against Argentina and
Brazil. Id.
90. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, The Protection
of Intellectual Property and Health Policy, (Dec. 1, 1999), available at www.ustr.gov (on
file with the author).
91. Five major pharmaceutical companies, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, Boehringer-
Ingelheim, GlaxoWellcome and F. Hoffman, entered a cooperative effort to accelerate ac-
cess to HIV/AIDS care and treatment in developing countries. See Press Release, Office
of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Barshefsky Welcomes Drug Company-
United Nation Announcement to Improve Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs (May 11, 2000),
[Vol. 3:339
2001] EXAMINATION OF THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 359
an executive order giving the USTR flexibility to provide life-saving
drugs to afflicted populations in South Africa. ' 2 While South Africa has
now been removed from the Special 301 watch list,93 the United States
has not applied this action uniformly to all developing countries. Al-
though the President's recent actions seem to indicate that the United
States is easing the burden on developing countries, in early January
2001, the office of the USTR provided notice that India was in danger of
having its duty-free access for imports from India withdrawn. "
C. India as the Leader of the Developing Nations' Opposition to
TRIPs
India led the unsuccessful fight against the establishment of a world
intellectual property regime, under the GATT." In particular, India op-
posed the intellectual property protection of pharmaceuticals." India ar-
gued that patenting much-needed medical products would make them
unattainable to consumers in developing countries.' 7 Despite the con-
available at www.ustr.gov (on file with author). Reahstically. this is just a token gesture
made in the face of increasing pressure from developing countries, and activists groups,
While the drug companies previously had the full support of the U.S. government. recentl
the Clinton administration took steps to stop pressing South Africa to change its patent
policy regarding pharmaceuticals. Id. See also Helene Cooper. Rachel Zimmerman &
Laurie McGinley, Patents Pending: Aids Epidemic Traps Drug Firins in a tise: Treatinent
vs. Profits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2. 2001. Al. A6.
92. See Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley. supra note 91, at Al. Ab (noting that, in
order to qualify, the actions had to be consistent with the \fTO TRIPs Agreement).
93. This was done as part of a joint initiative between the USTR and Health and
Human Services. See Press Release. Office of the United States Trade Representative. The
Protection of Intellectual Property and Health Policy, supra note 90. The cooperatise ap-
proach on health-related intellectual property issues is meant to ensure that trade law re-
lated to intellectual property remains flexible in response to the public health crisis. hi.
The USTR, Barshefsky, stated the belief that "sound public health policy and intellectual
property are, and must continue to be. mutually supportive." Id. While the statement
seemed to recognize that health emergencies might require special measures, no firm com-
mitment, other than to protect U.S. trade law relating to intellectual property in accor-
dance with TRIPs, was provided. See id. The only commitment the USTR gives to
addressing a health crisis in a country. is to "seek and give full weight to the advice of
[Health and Human Services] regarding the health considerations involved." Id.
94. See Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); Deadline for Submitting Public
Comments on Modification of Duty-Free Treatment for Certain Products Imported from
India, 66 Fed. Reg. 13.5521 (Jan. 19. 2001) (announcing that India may have its duty-free
benefits on some products removed).
95. See Long & D'Amato. Introduction: A Trip Begtns, supra note 14. at 7
96. See id.
97. See id. See also Sebastian Dominic. Patents and Indian Pharmnaceutcals Initlitt.
(Jan. 21, 1999) (stating that prices of drugs will go up by three to five times, and only ten
percent of the population will be able to afford them), at http://www,.sutelul.com arti-
cle.cfmlbusinessinindia/14753 (last visited Sept. 30. 2000).
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cerns of India and many other developing countries, the TRIPs Agree-
ment was placed on the table, giving developing countries little choice.
Essentially, these countries were forced to either agree to the version of
GATT including TRIPs, or be excluded from the benefit of GATT en-
tirely.98 Unfortunately, the trade-off placed developing countries and
public health policy at the whim of the developed countries once again.
Despite its opposition to TRIPs, India signed on.9 9
1. The WTO Provides Developed Nations with an Unfair
Advantage
Since the creation of the WTO, United States exports of goods and
service have risen by $170 billion and by $65 billion, respectively.100 De-
veloping countries have become increasingly concerned about the WTO's
ability to act for all of its members. 10 1 One commentator wrote:
Even though the majority of the 135 members of the WTO are poor
countries, they are being virtually held hostage. Third World coun-
tries ... [are] compelled to go along with the developed countries
because most of these poor countries are dependent on bilateral
trade relations with one or more developed countries.
102
Increasingly, the WTO appears to be becoming a tool for the devel-
oped nations. In early January 2000, Murasoli Maran, the Indian Com-
merce and Industry Minister, stressed that developing countries must
form a unified front against the WTO.' °3 Maran encouraged developing
nations to press the WTO to address their fears, anxieties and insecurities
by reforming the organization.1" The WTO has been labeled the
98. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, art. 70.8, 70.9.
99. India, along with 110 other countries, authenticated the results of the Uruguay
Round by signing the Final Act at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994. See Final Act, supra note
8. See also Tomar, supra note 14, at 591.
100. See America and the World Trade Organization, United States Trade Represen-
tative, supra note 86, at 9 (illustrating that Americans are extremely competitive in export
fields including medicines).
101. See New Economy Information Service, Is this Just a North/South Debate? (Dec.
8, 1999) [hereinafter Is this Just a North/South Debate?], at http://www.wtowatch.org/li-
brary/ad. . .. This_ Justa_NorthSouthDebate.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (on file with
author).
102. Id. (commenting on the Seattle WTO round).
103. Agence France Presse, India Urges Developing Countries to Close Ranks Against
WTO (Jan. 10, 2000), at http://www.wtowatch.org/news/index.cfm?ID=1378 (last visited
Sept. 30, 2000) (on file with author).
104. See id.
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"Wicked Trade Organization," and has been accused of attempting to po-
lice the world economy to the benefit of industrialists.'"'
2. The WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism
The WTO is meant to be a partnership of equals; however, it has been
noted that "some members are more equal than others." "' Ideally, any
member of the WTO may seek redress against another member through
the use of its dispute resolution panel.' Realistically, this remedy is
only available to those members who can afford this lengthy and expen-
sive process. l08 Clearly, this process favors industrialized countries. An-
other impediment to the use of the dispute resolution process is the fact
that many developing countries are unwilling to file a complaint against a
country that they may be dependent upon for aid.' The difficulties that
developing countries face in bringing cases to the WTO generally leave
them defenseless to developed countries' abuses, while any minor trans-
gression by a developing country is brought to the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). t ° Developing countries must choose their battles
carefully.
a. The United States v. India at the WTO
Beginning in 1996, the United States began utilizing the WTO's DSB to
file proceedings against India for alleged violations of the TRIPs Agree-
ment.1" Despite the transition period provided for developing countries,
105. WTOWATCH.org. WTO Director General Faces Protestors in India (Jan. 11.
2000). available at httpJ//vww.wtowatch.orgnewslindex.cfml D= 1396 (on file mith author).
106. International Development Research Centre. Issues of Concern to Canada at Fi-
ture WTO Negotiations, supra note 51.
107. See id. See also The United States Trade Representative. The Work of the USTR-
Intellectual Property. supra note 61 (noting that the United States has been aggressively
and successfully using the dispute settlement process of the \1To to assert its rights).
108. International Development Research Centre. Issues of Concern to (anada at Fit-
ture WTO Negotiations, supra note 51. Cf. Weissman. supra note 10. at 1095. The dispute
settlement mechanism will likely impose severe pressure on countries to alter their patent
systems. See id. Any sanctions will likely be detrimental to poor developing countries. See
id.
109. International Development Research Centre, Issues of Concern to ('anada at Fit-
ture WTO Negotiations, supra note 51.
110. See id.
111. Request for the Establishment of a Panel. Inha-Patent Protecton for Pharmna-
ceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products. Nov. 8. 1996, \\T/DS50U4 ( 19961. available at
1996 WL 908592: Chitra Subramaniam. IVTO Panel Charges Indit with Non-C'ompliance
with TRIPs Commitment. Financial Express: Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Ltd.
(Aug. 13, 1997), available at http://www.expressindia.com/fe/daily/19970813/ 2,55213.html
(on file with author). Cf TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra
note 32. art. 65. 66 (providing all developing countries, including India, are entitled to a 10
THE SCHOLAR
the United States asserted that certain provisions of TRIPs should be im-
mediately implemented.112 The United States' submission contended
that India's failure to comply would substantially damage the United
States pharmaceutical industry.' 13 In September, 1997, the Dispute Set-
tlement Panel determined that India had failed to comply with its TRIPs
obligations.' 14 India subsequently filed an appeal to the DSB, arguing
that the requirements of TRIPs could not be applied to developing coun-
tries until the January 1, 2005 transition date, and that the panel was in-
terpreting the provisions in TRIPs incorrectly as applied to developing
countries.1 15 The appellate body declined to find in India's favor and de-
termined that the measures India had taken were inadequate to meet its
year transition period to enact the intellectual property provisions of TRIPs, ending Janu-
ary 1, 2005).
112. In the action brought to the DSB, the United States stated that India's laws were
inconsistent with the requirements of TRIPs, including Articles 27, 65, and 70. See Re-
quest for the Establishment of a Panel, supra note 111. The request was specifically relat-
ing to provisions on Exclusive Marketing Rights (EMRs) and mailbox system. See id. See
Subramaniam, supra note 111.
113. First Submission of the United States of America, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Mar. 6, 1997, available at 1997 WL
113721. The United States asserted that India failed in its attempt to implement an EMR
system and to establish a mailbox, wherein U.S. patent holders could apply for patents.
See id. at *1. Specifically the U.S. cited India for its failure to conform with Article 70.8
and Article 70.9. Id. The United States argued that even though developing countries are
entitled to a ten year transition period, they must establish a system allowing applications
for product patent protection to be filed during the transition period, to be examined at a
later date, but based upon the date of application (the mailbox). See id. The U.S. also
asserted that developing countries were required to grant qualifying applicants exclusive
marketing rights for pharmaceutical products, for a period of up to five years. See id.
Although the U.S. submission discusses that the Indian President had promulgated a Pat-
ents Ordinance in 1994, and that the government had introduced a Patents Bill in 1995, to
amend the laws, the U.S. was dissatisfied with the lack of supplemental legislative action to
ensure implementation of the changes. See id. at *1-2. In light of India's "failure" to effect
changes in their laws the U.S. claims that India is inflicting damage on U.S. industries. Id.
Specifically, the U.S. submission claimed that their research based pharmaceutical compa-
nies lose approximately $500 million a year because of India's failure to provide pharma-
ceutical product patent protection. Id. at *2. This figure has not been corroborated by the
government. Id.
114. See Report of the Panel, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products, Sept. 5, 1997, WT/DS50/R (1997), available at 1997 WL 556224,
for a detailed report of the panel's finding.
115. See Notification of an Appeal, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, Oct. 16, 1997, WT/DS50/6 (1997), available at 1997 WL
644454. In its appeal, India argued that the Panel erred in requiring the examination of
foreign patent applications, under the mailbox provisions of Article 70.8, prior to the end
of the ten-year transitional period. Id. at *1. India asserted that "a proper interpretation of
the ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose of Article 70.8 and on the basis of
the negotiating history" India had not violated its TRIPs obligations. Id. at *2.
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TRIPs requirement as of January 1. 1995."i ' Although the panel had
room to interpret the effective dates positively for India and all develop-
ing nations, it chose to support the desire of the United States.
India is faced with little choice but to comply with the WTO panel's
instructions to pass legislation consistent with the TRIPs, in order to
maintain its GATT trade benefits."' India subsequently made reasona-
ble efforts to conform to the requirements of the panel as provided for in
status reports by India to the panel.' In April 1999. amendments to the
116. See Report of the Appellate Body. India-Patent Protction for Phartnaceutcal
and Agricultural Chenical Products. Dec. 19. 1997. \VT/DS501AB/R (1997), aivitlable at
1997 WL 781259. Under Indian law, international treaty obligations are not binding by
their own force, until appropriate legislative or executive action has brought them into
force. See Report of the Panel, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products. Aug. 24. 1998, WT/DS79/R (1998). available at 1998 WL 527064,
at *3.
117. See Foster. supra note 26. at 313 (noting that the reason India signed onto TRIPs
was to acquire the GATT benefits of reduced textile tariffs). See also Anju Ghangurde.
Patent Experts Sound Caution on EMR Issue. Financial Express: Indian Express Nesspa.
pers (Bombay) Ltd. (Nov. 25. 1998) (commenting on patent experts cautions to legislators
in India about the nature of the requirements being implemented). avadlable at httpi//
www.indian-express.com/fe/daily/19981126!33055464p.html (last visited Sept. 30. 2UJU),
118. India and the United States, through bilateral negotiations on April 21. 1998.
agreed that fifteen months constituted a reasonable period for implementing the recom-
mendations of the DSB. See Communication from India. India-Patent Protection for Piar-
maceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products. Nov. 12. 1998, WlT/DS5U'1 (1998),
available at 1998 WL 791621. In January. 1999. the Patents Amendment Ordinance was
promulgated by India to amend its Patents Act to comply with the obligations contained in
the TRIPs Agreement. See Communication by India. India-Patent Protection for Pharina-
ceutical and Agricultural Chenical Products, Jan. 14. 1999. \\T/DS5'0!0!Add.l (1999).
available at 1999 WL 14039. In this communication. India updated the panel about the
Patents (Amendment) Ordinance as promulgated on January 8. 1999. Id Additionally
India explained that a Bill to replace the ordinance would be introduced in the Budget
Session of Parliament commencing in late February. 1999. Id. As per the Indian Constitu-
tion, an ordinance is effective only for a period of six weeks from the re-assembly of Parlia-
ment. Id. However, an ordinance can expire before the six week period if both houses ot
parliament, the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, pass resolutions of disapproval. See id.
Most importantly, India assured the panel, that the matter would remain in the legislature
until the legislation received Parliament's approval. Id. Despite India's status report the
United States, joined by the European Community. filed another complaint against India
with the DSB regarding concerns about the ordinance. See Communication from the Per-
manent Mission of the United States. India-Patent Protection for Pharnaceuncal and Agri-
cultural Chemical Products, Jan. 20. 1999. WTIT/DS50/11 (1999), a% adable at 1999 WL 21262,
Request by the European Communities and its Member States Regarding Consultations
by the United States. India-Patent Protection .for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Cheinucal
Products. Feb. 4. 1999. WT/DS50/12 (1999). available at 1999 WL 48737. India responded
by restating that the ordinance was promulgated. and that a bill would replace it when the
Indian Parliament returned to session in the fourth week of February. See Communication
from the Permanent Mission of India. India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agri-
cultural Chemical Products. Feb. 5, 1999. WT/DS50/10/Add.2 (1999), available tt 1999 WL
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Patents Act were passed by both houses of the Indian Parliament and
were approved by the President, placing India in full compliance with the
recommendations of the panel.119
b. The VTO Upholds United States Unilateralism
In a separate dispute, the WTO upheld the right of the United States to
use unilateral trade sanctions through its 301 laws. 20 The latest ruling on
301 laws makes it clear that the VITO is not attempting to prevent unilat-
eral trade sanctions, but uphold them. When India signed on to the WTO
in Marrakesh, one of the main justifications was that the WTO, as a mul-
tilateral rule-based system, would render illegal the use of unilateral trade
sanctions through instruments like the 301 clauses.121
With rulings such as these it becomes increasingly apparent that the
WTO is a body dominated by the United States, while its trade rules up-
hold a system of economic dictatorship. 2 ' This relationship is visibly ap-
58731. The Indian Parliament returned to session on February 22, 1999. See Communica-
tion from the Permanent Mission of India, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, Mar. 9, 1999, WT/DS50/10/Add.3 (1999), available at 1999
WL 125361. In April, 1999, India further reported that the government had introduced a
Bill in the Indian Parliament to amend the Patents Act, 1970. See Communication from
the Permanent Mission of India, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricul-
tural Chemical Products, Apr. 16, 1999, WTIDS5OIIOIAdd.4 (1999), available at 1999 WL
231665.
119. Communication from the Permanent Mission of India, India-Patent Protection
for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Apr. 16, 1999, WTIDS5011O/Add.4
(1999).
120. See Report of the Panel, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
Dec. 22, 1999, WT/DS152/R (1999) (allowing the United States to institutionalize unilat-
eral trade sanctions). See also VTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding Regarding Sections
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,14037-38 (Mar. 23, 1999).
The EC contends that sections 301-310 are inconsistent with obligations of the U.S. under
the Dispute Settlement Understanding mechanism (DSU), the Marrakesh Agreement and
the GAIT 1994. Id. The EC made a claim that the Trade Act sections 301-310 impose:
"specific, strict time limits" that allow the United States to make unilateral determinations
and impose trade sanctions against WTO members. Id. "Specifically the EC alleges the
United States legislation is inconsistent with the obligations of the U.S. under Articles 3,
21, 22, and 23 of the DSU; Article EVI: 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the
WTO; and Articles I, II, III, VIII, and XI of the GAT 1994." Id.
121. See Dr. Vandana Shiva, WTO Defends Economic Dictatorship by Upholding Uni-
lateral Trade Sanctions and U.S. 301 Laws (Dec. 24, 1999), available at http://
www.wtowatch.org/news/index.dfm?ID=1347 (last visited Sept. 30, 2000) (on file with
author).
122. See id. This view is also held by some political leaders in the United States. See
Ralph Nader, Fair Trade, at http:l/www.votenader.com/issues/fairtrade.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2001). Ralph Nader, leader of the Green Party and presidential candidate in the
2000 United States Presidential election stated "'Free trade' is a misnomer. Monopoly
patents are not free trade; they're trying to convert all sorts of natural knowledge into
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parent when referencing the USTR Report on America and the WTO,
which states that the United States benefits from the dispute settlement
process "by having a set of rules to hold other countries accountable for
their trade actions." 1
It is time to stop describing WTO rules as offering multilateral protec-
tion against United States unilateralism, and see them for what they
are-the globalization of 301 laws, and instruments for forcing open mar-
kets to United States corporations at any cost, including the destruction
of livelihoods, the environment, and human health. Many developing na-
tions are justifiably suspicious of the WTO.' 4 The common feeling is
that the WTO is a tool the world powers can use to control the progress
of developing countries by dominating their trade markets and exports
through the use of monopoly patents. ' - Arguably, the WTlO is merely a
prelude to the imposition of the United States' governed New Economic
Order in the World.' 2
6
This belief that intellectual property protection, through the TRIPs as
administered by the WTO, favors the "have" nations has become particu-
larly controversial as it relates to patent protection of pharmaceuticals.
Patent owners contend that a lack of patent protection will result in lost
revenue leading to a lack of desire to fund new drug research.'"7 Further-
more, they argue that in the absence of patent protection many low-qual-
intellectual property. 20-year patents. That's not free trade and the rest of it is corporate
managed trade." Id.
123. America and the World Trade Organization. United States Trade Representative.
supra note 86, at 13 (emphasis added). In answer to a question on whether U.S. sover-
eignty would be affected by the WTO rules or dispute settlement process the USTR re-
sponded that:
The findings of a WTO dispute settlement panel canot force us to change our laws.
Only the United States determines exactly how it will respond to the reconmenda-
tions of a WTO panel, if at all. If a U.S. measure is ever found to be in violation of a
WTO provision, the United States may on its own decide to change the law: compen-
sate a foreign country.. .or do nothing (emphasis added) ... But America retains full
sovereignty in its decision of whether or not to implement a panel recommendation.
Id.
124. Patents: Private Rights and Public Interests. MARKIIAT Ti-R. Nov. 2. 1992. [here-
inafter Patents: Private Rights and Public Interests], available at 1992 WL 2794546.
125. See id. For poor developing countries, whose health care systems must attempt
to provide pharmaceuticals for those who cannot afford them, a patent is viewed as confer-
ring a monopoly. which leads to high prices and places drugs further out of the reach of the
poor. See id.
126. Is this Just a North/South Debate?. supra note 101 (listing the concerns of China,
Malaysia, Pakistan. Romania. South Korea. India, Sri Lanka. Syria. and Brazill).
127. See Doris E. Long & Anthony D'Amato. The AIDS Drugs Controversv., in 1.
TERNA7O1NAL INTELLEC-UAL PROPERTY 126 (Doris Long & Anthony D'Amato eds.
2000) [hereinafter Long & D'Amato. The AIDS Drugs Controversy]: Mossinghoff. supra
note 12, at 599.
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ity inefficacious or harmful drugs will enter the market due to a lack of
quality control. 2 ' On the other side of the spectrum, many developing
countries assert that increased competition, created by a non-existent or
ineffective patent regime, will produce lower prices on medicines, a prior-
ity for their people.' 2 9 Currently, the patenting of essential medicines
places them outside the reach of poor countries and only enriches the
coffers of the developed world. India's patent policy is one system that
has attempted to keep pharmaceuticals out of the hands of intellectual
property protectionists.
IV. THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF INDIA'S PATENT
POLICIES RELATING TO PHARMACEUTICALS
A. The Road to the Indian Patent Act of 1970
India gained independence in 1947, after over one-hundred years of
imperialism as a colony under the British Empire. 3 ' At the time of inde-
pendence, India only controlled ten percent of its pharmaceutical mar-
ket.131 Its drug prices were among the most expensive in the world due
to foreign corporations controlling the remaining ninety percent of the
market. 3 2 Between 1967 and 1970 applications for patents by foreign
nationals exceeded applications of Indians by over 340%.133 Indepen-
dent India acted to reverse this situation by implementing protectionist
measures on pharmaceutical patents.13 4
India developed the Indian Patents Act of 1970131 to increase the indi-
gent population's access to pharmaceuticals, while simultaneously devel-
128. See Long & D'Amato, The AIDS Drugs Controversy, supra note 127, at 126.
129. See id.
130. See Tomar, supra note 14, at 580.
131. See id. at 582.
132. See id. See also Adelman & Baldia, supra note 14, at 526 (providing that during
that time the cost of medicines in India were among the highest in the world).
133. Koshy, supra note 25, at para. 12.
134. See Adelman & Baldia, supra note 14, at 519, 526-27 (explaining that India justi-
fied these protectionist measures as necessary to combat foreign monopolistic prices, to
ensure that inventions were worked in India and to establish a local industry in India).
135. Patents Act, 1970, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450 (1979) [hereinafter Patents
Act). Under the Patents Act, India recognizes patents under a fourteen-year period of
protection. See id. at § 53 (1)(b). However, it provides an exception in three areas: food.
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, where it recognizes only a process patent for a period of
seven years. See id. at § 5(a)-(b), 53 (1)(a). See also Adelman & Baldia, supra note 14, at
519, 526-27 (noting that the fourteen year patent life was six years shorter than the interna-
tional standard (emphasis added)); Koshy, supra note 25, at para. 3-11 (outlining the Pat-
ents Act of 1970 as it applies to pharmaceuticals).
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oping a research and development initiative among Indian nationals."b
India used protectionist provisions in the Patent Act to assist in the devel-
opment of the pharmaceutical industry by making new medicines at af-
fordable prices and by making those medicines readily available to the
public ensuring its national development at the expense of foreign corpo-
rations.137 The 1970 Act only provided pharmaceutical patents for the
process by which a product was made and not the end product itself."t '-
Thus, if an Indian pharmaceutical company could find an innovative or
new way to make the exact same product as offered by a brand name
company, that product was deemed to be acceptable and in accordance
with the Act.1 39
Due to weak patent laws, Indian pharmaceutical companies have been
able to reproduce existing drugs at a rapid pace and low cost, which en-
ables them to compete in both foreign and domestic markets."' 0 Addi-
tionally, due to weak enforcement policies, Indian owned pharmaceutical
companies were generally not concerned about issues of legal infringe-
ment or potential litigation expenses.' 4 ' Indian pharmaceutical compa-
nies have been able to curb the domination of foreign corporations in the
domestic market, providing India with more independence in its eco-
nomic and political sectors. 142
In the last fifty years, India has lowered pharmaceutical prices and
since 1996, Indian-owned pharmaceutical companies comprise 85% of the
domestic market while the remaining 15% is controlled by pharmaceuti-
cal companies from the United States and Europe.'43 India has resisted
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement for fear that the Agreement
would reverse the course of history and cause it to revert to being a de-
pendent nation.144
136. See Tomar, supra note 14. at 582 (commenting on the increased independence
the Indian pharmaceutical market felt after India won its independence).
137. See Adelman & Baldia. supra note 14. at 526: Koshy, supra note 25, at para. 12.
138. Patents Act, supra note 135. § 5(a)-(b). 53(l)(a). See Koshy. supra note 25. at
para. 8: Indian Company Advances Globally With Cop), Drugs. AsIAN WALL S IRu- tI
JOURNAL, Sept. 23, 1993, available at 1993 WL-WSJA 2008768. See also Weissman. supra
note 10, at 1073 (remarking that until recently. India only provide process patents for
pharmaceuticals).
139. Cf. Koshy. supra note 25. at para. 15 (noting that the Indian Patent Act of 1970
did not provide product patents for pharmaceuticals).
140. See Tomar. supra note 14, at 582.
141. See id.
142. See idL
143. See id at 582-83.
144. See id at 583. See also Koshy. supra note 25. at para. 36. 37. The Indian govern-
ment provides free pharmaceuticals at public sector hospitals to the poor who are defined
as one-fifth of the urban and one-third of the rural population. See id. at para. 36 n.121
(citing HEINZ REDWOOD, NEW HORIZONS IN INDIA: THE CONSEQ'ENCi-S Of PAIMAIAtt'
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B. India and Its Current Patent Regime
Currently, the population in India surpasses one billion people.'45 This
population is packed into a small area of only 1,269,338 square miles." 6
India's incredible population density contributes to its high poverty level
therefore increasing the need for low-priced necessities, such as
pharmaceuticals.147 Thus, there is a high demand on the pharmaceutical
industry and the Indian government to provide medical supplies to the
population at affordable prices.14 8
The United States, along with its pharmaceutical corporations, has
sought to have this changed by requiring product patents in addition to
process patents through the TRIPs agreement.1 49 Therefore, if the end-
product of the Indian company is the same as the end-product of a brand
name company, it should be a violation of patent law because it is the
same product. 150  India, like most developing countries, has fought
against the imposition of product patents.151
For India, the establishment of a strict patent system is unlikely to stim-
ulate growth or encourage research and development as industrialized
countries assert. Rather, India is concerned that increased protection will
have the opposite effect and actually diminish the promotion of domestic
technology, research and development.15 2 India asserts that all GATF/
WTO countries should be allowed to focus on their individual develop-
TICAL PATENT PROTECION 24 (1994)). Requiring TRIPs style patents on essential
medicines will lead to price increases that could bankrupt the health care system. See id.
145. See Office of the Registrar General of India, supra note 23 (stating that the popu-
lation of India on March 1, 2001 was 1,012,395,934).
146. See Tomar, supra note 14, at 580-81. Approximately 320 million Indians lived
below the poverty line in 1993. Id. In comparison, the United States is three times larger,
in size, with a population of only two-hundred and fifty million dispersed across the coun-
try. Id. at 581.
147. See id. at 581. Illness and early death go hand in hand with poverty. See Sarah
Boseley, Trade Terrorism- U.S. Attempts to Stop Developing Countries Producing Cheap
AIDS Drugs Have Become a Political Time Bomb, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 1999, at http:/
/www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
148. Tomar, supra note 14, at 581.
149. Elliott, supra note 58, at All.
150. See id.
151. See generally, Koshy, supra note 25. Notably, developing countries such as India
are not the only protectionist nations as to pharmaceuticals. See id. at para. 14. Until
recently, many developed countries also employed restrictive intellectual property laws.
See id. Canada did not provide product patents on pharmaceuticals until 1987 and allowed
compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals until 1991. See id. See also Adelman & Baldia,
supra note 14, at 511 (stating that Canada formerly sustained weak pharmaceutical patent
laws); Wechkin, supra note 38, at 243 (commenting on the protectionist stance of New
Zealand and Canada).
152. See Gutterman. supra note 42, at 132.
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mental needs instead of pursuing an intellectual property system that fa-
vors developed countries.
153
V. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST PHARMACETrI CAL PAIE-NUS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
TRIPs, administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO),"' re-
quires that all signatory countries grant patent protection to pharmaceuti-
cal products. 155 Previously, several developing and developed countries
153. See id.
154. TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7. See Weissman. supra note 10. at 1094. The
World Trade Organization (WTO). was established as a result of the final round ot the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade negotiations, also kno%%n as the Uruguay Round.
Id. The WTO is responsible for monitoring national trading policies, handling trade dis-
putes, and enforcing the GATI agreements. which are designed to reduce tariffs and other
barriers to international trade. Id. It has far greater power to mediate trade disputes be-
tween member countries, through the inclusion of a dispute resolution mechanism to re-
view and resolves disputes. Id.
155. See TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7. art. 27. TRIPs mandates broad subject mat-
ter protection, bringing classes of inventions that had been excluded from patent protec-
tion in a number of developing countries, such as agricultural chemicals and
pharmaceuticals, within world wide patent protection. See id. Article 27 details what ts
patentable subject matter and in pertinent part provides:
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3. patents shall be available for any
inventions, whether products or process. in all fields of technology, provided that they
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. Subject to
paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this article.
patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination.
(2) Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within their
territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public
or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid
serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such exclusion is not made merely
because the exploitation is prohibited by their law.
(3) Members may also exclude from patentability:
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or
animals:
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological
process...
Id. (footnote omitted). TRIPs also mandates the provision of a broad, uniform range of
rights. See id. art. 28. Article 28 provides:
(1) A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product. to prevent third parties not
having the owner's consent form the acts of: making. using, offering for sale, sell-
ing or importing for these purposes that product:
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process. to prevent third parties not
having the owner's consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of:
using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes at least the product
obtained directly by that process.
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had excluded medicines from being patented.' 56 The TRIPs Agreement
however, made pharmaceutical patents a requirement for all members of
the WTO.'5 7 TRIPs established a number of minimum standards, includ-
ing granting twenty-year patent protection to pharmaceuticals.' 58 As a
result, pharmaceutical companies are not only able to control access to
patented drugs, but are allowed the freedom to set prices for those prod-
ucts. 159 Developing countries assert that the required protections give
those companies free reign over profits to the detriment of the poverty-
stricken populations of the developing world. 6° However, drug compa-
nies claim that such prices are necessary in order to recoup research and
development costs, as well as future research costs.1 6 t
Despite these provisions, some developing countries, including India,
have refused to extend patent protection to pharmaceuticals.16 2 Many
developing countries have also attempted to utilize loopholes, such as
compulsory licenses and parallel imports provided for in TRIPs, to avoid
the patent provisions.163 TRIPs Article 31, meant to be one such loop-
(2) Patent owners all also have the right to assign, or transfer by succession, the pat-
ent and to conclude licensing contracts.
Id. (footnote omitted). But see TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, art. 28 n.6. Although
Article 28(l)(a) of TRIPs confers an exclusive right of importation, this right "in respect of
the use, sale, importation or other distribution of goods is subject to the provisions of
Article 6." Id. For a detailed discussion on parallel imports and the implications of Article
6, see infra note 166.
156. See Elliott, supra note 58, at All.
157. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, and text accompanying supra note 155, art 27,
28. See Elliott, supra note 58, at All; Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Report to Thailand, supra
note 22.
158. See TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7, art. 33. Article 33 provides:
The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of
twenty years counted from the filing date.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Mrdecins Sans Fronti~res, Report to Thailand, supra note
22.
159. See Elliott, supra note 58, at All (asserting that the four large pharmaceutical
firms act as a cartel to wield monopoly prices on pharmaceutical products).
160. See Press Release, World Health Organization, WTO to Address Trade and
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 30 (expressing that many WHO Member States are concerned
that WTO-TRIPs Agreement could cause a negative impact on access to healthcare by
creating a higher cost burden on essential drugs). See also Long & D'Amato, The AIDS
Drugs Controversy, supra note 127, at 126 (noting increased protection will allow those
companies to charge supra monopolistic prices in the developing world).
161. See Long & D'Amato, The AIDS Drugs Controversy, supra note 127, at 126.
162. These actions should be legitimized and supported by the fact that the WHO has
highlighted the need to support countries in their quest to achieve access to affordable
medicines as a key priority. See WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999, supra note 19, at xii.
163. See Elliott, supra note 58, at All. The TRIPs Agreement included safeguards to
protect the interests of developing countries. See id. The first loophole, compulsory licenses
found in Article 31 allows a country to override a patent, while the second loophole found
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hole, grants the use of a patent through compulsory licenses." ' A com-
pulsory license allows the production of medicines by companies other
than the patent holder in certain instances, such as public health emer-
gencies or unfair pricing practices.1 65
Article 6 of TRIPs is silent on the issue of parallel imports."' This
silence allows developing countries to import medicines from countries
other than the country of manufacture.6 7 Parallel imports are "genuine
goods or services imported by a reseller into a country without the au-
thorization of the owner of the intellectual property right in that coun-
try." '168 The idea of parallel importing stems from the doctrine of
exhaustion. 69 The doctrine states that a patentee is entitled to secure the
in Article 6, permits a country to determine its own policies relating to parallel imports.
See id.
164. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7. art. 31. Article 31 provides for use of a
patent without authorization of the right holder. See tit. In pertinent part Article 31
provides:
Where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third
parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected:
(a) authorization of such use shall be considered on its individual merits:
(b) such use may only be permitted if. prior to such use, the proposed user has
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder... This requirement nav
be waived by a Member in the case of national energency or other ctrcunotanccs of
extreme urgency or in cases of public non-coninercial use...
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See Boseley. supra note 147.
165. TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 164. art. 31(b)
(providing that in the case of a national emergency or other extreme urgency compulsory
licensees are available). See Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Report to Thalanl, supra note 2.
166. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7. art. 6. TRIPs remains silent on the issue of
parallel imports as noted in Article 6, which reads in pertinent part:
For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement . . . nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights.
Id. Further, although Article 28(1)(a) of TRIPs confers an exclusive right of importation.
this right is subject to the provisions of Article 6. See TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7 and
text accompanying supra note 155 art. 28 n.6. See also Barrett. supra note 9. at 918 n.22.
Parallel imports were debated in the GAT negotiations. Id. However, the developed and
developing countries maintained divergent opinions and thus no consensus was achieved.
See id. As a consequence of this division, the TRIPs Agreement remains silent on the
issue. Id.
167. See Mddecins Sans Fronti res. Report to Thailand, supra note 22.
168. Barrett, supra note 9. at 914 n.12 (quoting Claude E. Barfield & Mark A Groom-
bridge, The Economic Case for Copyright Owner Control over Parallel Inports, 1 J.
WORLD INrEL. PROP. 903 (1998)). The subject of parallel imports is very intricate. See
Barrett, supra note 9, for a detailed discussion.
169. The doctrine of exhaustion (DOE). also known as the doctrine of first sale. pro-
vides that an intellectual property owner has exclusive control over the first sale of an
invention. See Barrett, supra note 9. at 911-12. Once the owner authorzes the release of
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financial benefit of an invention only once. Once the patentee receives
the benefit from the sale of a patented article, the patentee's rights to that
product are exhausted. 170 The issue of parallel imports occurs, in part, as
a reaction to a patent holder's practice of international price discrimina-
tion, charging higher or lower prices in different countries based on the
cost that the market of a particular country can bear.1 71 For example,
since the standard of living is considerably higher in the United States
than a developing country, patentees are able to charge a price above that
of the cost of the same item in a developing country. 172 Many developing
countries assert that parallel imports will serve to maintain a fair level of
price competition in international markets. 173  Additionally, foreign
that item into the stream of commerce, all rights the owner previously had to control the
item are exhausted. Id. at 912. Ideally, this right of first sale should provide an adequate
financial incentive to ensure continued investment in the creative process, while still al-
lowing purchasers and their successors in title to be free to use and resell the goods without
seeking permission or paying a royalty. Id. at 912-13. Barrett provides a detailed discus-
sion of three competing theories relating to the doctrine of exhaustion. See id. at 911 n.3.
914-16. The three competing theories are: 1. International exhaustion theory; 2. Modified
international exhaustion theory; 3. Territorial/Domestic exhaustion theory. See id. Under
the DOE, once a patent owner makes the first sale of a patented article, that article is no
longer subject to the patent. Id. at 931. The first sale of a product exhausts the patent
monopoly and removes any patent rights over subsequent sale of the product. See id. at
931, 937. However, a patentee's rights are not exhausted if the first sale of an invention is
made without permission, which would preclude the patentee from receiving the initial
benefit from the sale of that invention. See id. at 937
170. See id. at 912.
171. See id. at 958.
172. See id. Because of this price discrepancy, third parties may purchase a patented
product in a developing country, at a low price and then resell the product in the United
States placing it in direct competition with the United States patent. See id. Thus the
parallel importer may be able to charge a lower price to United States consumers than the
United States patentee. Id. Notably, the ability to resell a product in the United States at
discriminatory price is not the only incentive to parallel importers. See id. at 958-59. Price
differentials may reflect the higher cost a patent owner initially incurs through marketing a
product. See id. at 959. For example, a parallel importer who resells goods in the United
States, free rides on the patentee's expenditures such as advertising and marketing costs,
which may have created the consumers' desire for a particular patented product. See id. In
such a situation a parallel importer makes a substantial profit by charging a decreased price
in the United States. Id. at 958.
173. See Long & D'Amato, Does Intellectual Property Favor the "Have" Nations?,
supra note 49, at 135-36. Free riding is not inherently undesirable, and may be highly
beneficial to the public, as long as it does not undermine the incentive to offer the product
or service that is the subject of free riding. Id. The existence of some free riding by paral-
lel imports is not, in itself, a reason to prohibit parallel importing. Id. A number of devel-
oping countries advocate for a rule of international exhaustion rule which would allow for
parallel imports. See Barrett, supra note 9, at 951 n.136. See also McCabe, supra note 9, at
56 (noting that developing countries attain many benefits from corporations that copy pat-
ented goods).
[Vol. 3:339
20011 EXAMINATION OF THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 373
courts reject the assertion that exhaustion relies on the availability and
quality of patent protection in the country where the first sale occurs.' 71
The European Court of Justice, ruled that a pharmaceutical proprietor
exhausted its right to patent protection for a pharmaceutical product
once it first placed the product on the market. t7' Accordingly, develop-
ing countries should not be held to standards higher than industrialized
countries, such as the members of the European Union and should be
allowed the freedom to permit parallel importation.
Now that developing countries have signed onto the Agreement, the
safeguards of compulsory licensing and parallel importing, that had been
placed in the Agreement to alleviate developing countries concerns, are
not being enforced, and, in fact, developing countries are being pressured
by Western governments to ban compulsory licensing and parallel im-
ports. 176 In 1994, the United States Congress amended the United States'
Patent Act to bring the United States into full compliance with TRIPs.'"
Since the TRIPs Agreement does not address parallel importation, Con-
174. See Barrett, supra note 9. at 966 n.177 (listing cases involving European Union
countries and Japan).
175. See Case 187/80, Merck & Co. Inc. v. Stephar. 1981 E.C.R. 2063. The court ruled
that parallel importation was permissible where:
[tihe proprietor of a patent for a medicinal preparation who sells the preparation in
one Member State where patent protection exists, and then markets it himself in an-
other Member State where there is no such protection, [prevents the proprietor] from
availing himself of the right conferred by legislation of the first Member State to pre-
vent the marketing in that state of the said preparation imported from the other Mem-
ber State.
Id. Additionally the court stated: -That right of first placing a product on the market
enables the inventor, by allowing him a monopoly in exploiting his product, to obtain a
reward for his creative effort without, however, guaranteeing that he will obtain such a
reward in all circumstances." Id.
176. See Mddecins Sans Fronti~res. Report to Thailand supra note 22. See also
Wechkin, supra note 38, at 237 (commenting that due to pharmaceutical manufacturers
desire to created an intellectual property regime the use of compulsory licensing provisions
has been severely impeded); Elliott, supra note 58. at All (noting that the United States is
making every effort to close the two loopholes).
177. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465 §§ 532, 533, 108 Stat.
4809, 4983-90 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 154) (1994). As amended by this Act,
the Patent Act § 154(a)(1) provides:
Every Patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his
heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale. or
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from
using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States. or importing into the
United States, products made by that process. referring to the specification for the
particulars thereof.
Id. Section 271(a), as amended, provides in part:
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gress was not required to enact legislation against parallel imports in or-
der to make the United States TRIPs compliant; however, the President's
Statement of Administrative Action speaks to parallel importation. 78
The Statement conveys that United States law is already largely TRIPs
compliant, and consequently, few changes to the law are required.' 79
Inappropriately, the Statement also indicates that the TRIPs Agreement
will have no affect on the law relating to parallel imports in the United
States. 80 This statement does not coincide with the reality of the TRIPs
Agreement which is silent on parallel imports, and thus cannot be seen as
requiring a country to legislate against them. Clearly, this interpretation
of parallel imports by the United States indicates that the United States is
attempting to interpret all TRIPs provisions to their own benefit. In fact,
TRIPs does not require a change in United States law with respect to
parallel importation even though the President indicates in his statement
that such legislation was required. 8" Subsequently, the United States has
threatened to sanction many countries that have applied such compulsory
licenses or have practiced parallel importation.182
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, or
sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of the patent
therefore, infringes the patent.
Id. See also Barrett, supra note 9, at 949-54.
178. See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Uruguay
Round Trade Agreements, Text of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of Adminis-
trative Action and Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Statement of Administrative Action], reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040. See Barrett, supra note 9, at 952-53.
179. See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 178, at 4280; Barrett, supra
note 9, at 952.
180. See Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 178, at 4287; Barrett, supra
note 9, at 952-53.
181. See Barrett, supra note 9, at 951-53.
182. See Fidler, supra note 19, at 211 (commenting that the United States government
has put extreme economic and diplomatic pressure on South Africa and Thailand, "to turn
them away from compulsory licensing."). See Wechkin, supra note 38, at 243. Not only
have developing countries been subject to the threat of trade sanctions but countries such
as New Zealand and Canada were also threatened by United States pressure. See id. at
256. As a result of this pressure New Zealand and Canada repealed their compulsory
licensing provisions for pharmaceuticals. Id. See Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Report to
Thailand, supra note 22. See also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying
supra note 166, art. 6; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note
164, art. 31. Notwithstanding the language of Article 6, some commentators have argued
that other provisions of TRIPs or other Agreements with the GATT indirectly prohibit a
policy of international exhaustion. See, e.g., Harvey E. Bale, The Conflicts Between Paral-
lel Trade and Product Access and Innovation: The Case for Pharmaceuticals, I J. Irrr'L
EcoN. L. 637, 644, n.7 (1998) (relying on TRIPs art. 28). But see TRIPs Agreement, supra
note 7 and text accompanying supra note 155, art. 28 n.6 (defeating such arguments for
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Having signed the Agreement. the Indian Parliament is required to
amend its intellectual property laws to comply with the requirements set
forth in TRIPs. 183 In the area of pharmaceutical patents, India and other
developing countries have a transition period which will continue until
January 1, 2005.1' Additionally, TRIPs requires member countries to
provide both product and process patent protection to patent owners, in-
cluding the exclusive rights to make, use, offer for sale, sell, or import a
patented product or process.' 85 Signatories to TRIPs may exclude inven-
tions from patentability if they do not protect public morality, "human,
animal or plant life or health. " '86 For example, these countries may ex-
clude inventions in order to avoid serious prejudice to the environ-
ment. a87 However, because TRIPs does not authorize the exclusion of
pharmaceutical products from patent protection, developing countries
are required to extend protection to pharmaceuticals."'
The TRIPs requirement, that governments provide both process and
product patent protection to pharmaceuticals, will substantially increase
the cost of pharmaceuticals, negatively affect the health of the poor and
inhibit the government from providing real assistance to combat India's
tremendous poverty.189 Enforcing the TRIPs Agreement in the manner
which industrialized countries demand will retard the positive growth In-
dia has experienced both in its labor force and health care of its people.
their failure to take into account footnote 6 to Article 28, indicating that Article 28 must be
consistent with Article 6. which remains silent as to DOE).
183. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7. art. I. In pertinent part Article I pro% ides:
1. Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may. but
shall not be obliged to, implement in their laws more extensive protection than ts
required by this agreement. provided that such protection does not contravene the
provisions of this Agreement.
2. Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement to the nation-
als of other Members.
Id. (footnote omitted).
184. See TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 32. art.
65, art. 66 (providing developing country members a ten year transition period to imple-
ment intellectual property in pharmaceuticals).
185. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 155. art.
28.
186. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 155, art.
27(2): McCabe, supra note 9. at 50-51.
187. See TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 155. art.
27, 28.
188. See Weissman. supra note 10. at 1097-98 (noting Article 27 on its face makes the
exclusion of pharmaceuticals from patent protection illegal): Koshy, supra note 25. at para.
29 (explaining that the exceptions provided for in Article 27 do not specifically include
pharmaceuticals. therefore all TRIPs members must comply with Article 28 and extend
product patent protection to pharmaceuticals).
189. See Tomar, supra note 14. at 583.
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Full enforcement of the TRIPs Agreement negatively affects the govern-
ment's ability to provide pharmaceutical products at affordable prices. 9 '
Furthermore, the TRIPs 'plus' attitude that developed countries such as
the United States employ by increasing bilateral trade pressure, cannot
be allowed to continue. t91 At the 1998 World Health Assembly, the
United States State Department representatives threatened to withdraw
funding from the WHO when the organization aggressively supported im-
proved access to patented medicines in developing countries." Despite
the heavy handed attitude of the United States, continued support by the
WHO, which received a mandate to monitor the public health conse-
quences of international trade agreements, provides developing countries
with some encouragement.
193
A. Brand Name Innovators v. Generic Manufacturers
To understand the issues, the competing agendas must be understood.
Two groups comprise the pharmaceutical sector. These groups are 1) the
innovators of new, brand name drugs and 2) the producers of generic or
copied medicines.1 94 The United States, as a world leader in pharmaceu-
tical innovation, supports increased patent protection, while India, which
relies predominately on copied generic medicines, does not.
1. The Innovators
In the United States, the innovators dominate generic producers." 95
The United States is a research-intensive country. Patent protection is
given high priority due to the large amounts of money spent on research
and development of new drugs. 96 An innovator is able to charge mo-
nopolistic prices and recoup expenditures via patent protection.' 97 As a
190. See id. at 581.
191. TRIPs plus treatment occurs when developing countries are placed under addi-
tional pressure to implement changes in their laws that are above and beyond the TRIPs
requirements. See Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Report to Thailand, supra note 22.
192. See id.
193. See WHA 52.19, Revised Drug Strategy, supra note 30; M6decins Sans Frontires,
Report to Thailand, supra note 22.
194. Foster, supra note 26, at 296. See generally, Sanjiv Shankaran, India: What Is the
Generic Market All About, BUSINEss LINE, Oct. 8, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27313161.
195. Foster, supra note 26, at 296.
196. Id. at 297.
197. Id. See James M. Silbermann, Comment, The North American Free Trade Agree-
ment's Effect of Pharmaceutical Patents: A Bitter Pill to Swallow or a Therapeutic Solution?,
12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 607, 635 (1996) (explaining that a patent holder's
limited monopoly on his invention results in higher product costs for the consumer). See
also Shankaran, supra note 194 (noting that in the U.S. a product that is patented remains
the monopoly of the patent owner).
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result, the research-based pharmaceutical industry is most interested in
protecting intellectual property, and is most upset when their sales are
undercut by copiers abroad. t98 Innovators have 40% of sales in foreign
markets, but lose approximately five billion dollars in revenue from sales
to copiers. 199 The United States pharmaceutical industry has had a sus-
tained campaign to focus its trade policy on ensuring expanded patent
protection since the 1980s.2 °
2. The Generic Manufacturers
Generic manufacturers2° t in the United States have little influence in
the political process.20 2 Generic products in the United States can be
sold at prices substantially cheaper than the prices patent holders receive
for their product.20 3 However, generic manufacturers in the United
States are distinguishable from those found in most developing countries.
In the United States, generic producers wait until a patent expires
before making copies of a product, while in developing countries like In-
dia, producers ignore existing patents to develop copies of pharmaceuti-
cals that are sold at much lower prices. Thus, even though Indian generic
producers wield greater political influence, '2 they are bound to the stan-
dards of TRIPs as dictated by industrialized nations.
In India, the generic manufacturers make copies of drugs regardless of
whether the original patent is still valid. 2 5 This occurs because Indian
patent laws are extraordinarily weak and many product patents for
pharmaceuticals are still unrecognized. 2 ° ' In India, patents are only
granted on the chemical process used to produce the drug, despite the
fact that a new product can be created which is identical to the end prod-
198. See Foster, supra note 26. at 297-98.
199. Id. at 297-98.
200. See &L at 298. This campaign of the pharmaceutical industry has included large
cash donations in the political arena. See id. Notably between 1981 and 1992. campaign
donations to House and Senate candidates amounted to more than S8.5 million, hi. These
donations are provided equally to Democrats and to Republicans. Id. Thus. the pharma-
ceutical industry holds a great deal of influence over the government. Set' id at 299. See
Weissman. supra note 10, at 1070.
201. See Foster, supra note 26. at 301. for a detailed discussion on generic
manufacturers.
202. Id. at 301. Notably 50% of prescriptions in United States are generic, hi. Thts
occurs despite the fact that innovators outnumber generic companies. hi.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 306: Tomar, supra note 14. at 583.
205. See Foster. supra note 26. at 306: Shankaran. supra note 194.
206. See Foster, supra note 26, at 306: Shankaran. supra note 194.
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uct. 20 7 Thus, even when a patent is available, it poses no real obstacle to
the creation of a generic copy as long as a different chemical process is
used to obtain the same product.208
The TRIPs Agreement requires patents to be provided for both the
process and the product of an invention. 20 9 This requirement will force
an increase in prices charged for products in developing countries, though
industrialized nations will not be substantially affected.2 0 As most indus-
trialized countries already have patent systems in place, the TRIPs
Agreement merely reinforces their current system without leading to
price changes. 211
B. Viewpoint of the Western Pharmaceutical Companies, the United
States & Industrialized Nations
Western pharmaceutical companies view most generic producers of
pharmaceuticals in developing countries as pirates who unfairly profit
from their research.2 2 Recently, Harvey Bale, the Director General of
the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion, stated that the protection of patents, which are "the foundation of
research and development," must be a priority for the industry.21 3 Ac-
cordingly, during the Uruguay round of trade talks, the pharmaceutical
industry, backed by the United States, successfully lobbied for stronger
207. See Foster, supra note 26, at 307; Shankaran, supra note 194; Indian Company
Advances Globally with Copy Drugs, supra note 138.
208. "When TRIPs enters into full force in India an estimated 10,000 local pharma-
ceutical manufacturers which currently produce 70% of India's medicines, will collapse due
to an inability to market their generic drugs." See Foster, supra note 26, at 307.
209. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 155, art.
28; Tomar, supra note 14, at 584.
210. See Foster, supra note 26, at 305.
211. See id.
212. See Michael M. Phillips & Mark Schoofs, U.N. 's Annan Starts Aids Drug Cam-
paign, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2,2001, at A7. Cf McCabe, supra note 9, at 56 (stating that most
industrialized countries assert that there is no economic benefit to pirating). See also
Weissman, supra note 10, at 1088. Generic producers of pharmaceuticals are labeled pi-
rates by the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. government. Id. Countries with weak
patent policies are denounced as harbors for such pirates. Id. Notably this use of a piracy
metaphor changed what should have been a policy debate into an "absolutist moral
drama." Id. Rather than addressing developing countries' concerns that they should be
allowed to develop their own industries prior to adopting intellectual property protection,
the use of the pirate metaphor marks such countries as supporting theft and thieves. See
id. This attitude leaves no room for review of the merits of so-called piracy. Id.
213. Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley, supra note 91, at Al, A6.
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intellectual property protection to be incorporated into the
Agreement.214
The United States Trade Representative, which was a leading force in
establishing the VTO,215 has long backed the drug industry.2 " A 1998
statement by the USTR stated that the WTO helps the United States
achieve its purpose of ensuring the prosperity and growth of the United
States by providing it with the ability to sell its goods and services to
consumers everywhere..21 7 Additionally. it stated that the United States
sought to secure maximum benefits for American businesses and workers
by obtaining a strong, binding, and expeditious dispute settlement process
through the WTO.21 ' Notably, during the United States 2000 Presiden-
tial Campaign, the drug industry spent an unprecedented $80 million to
help elect George W. Bush and ensure that the government stood behind
the industry.219 The United States government has pressed all countries
not only to comply with TRIPs, but also to accelerate implementation of
these obligations.220
214. See Weissman. supra note 10. at 1084. The United States call for world-w-ide
adoption of U.S. style patent law. was largely influenced by its pharmaceutical industr'.
Id. In fact, the Intellectual Property Committee. claimed to have acted in a -key advisory
role" at the request of the USTR. in the development of the government's proposal
presented in the GAIT-TRIPs negotiations. Id. See also America and the World Trade
Organization, United States Trade Representative. supra note 8t. at 5 (admitting that the
United States sought and obtained, in the WTO. agreements on intellectual property, in
order to open U.S. markets and lower barriers to U.S. exports): Elliott. supra note 58, at
All (establishing that the pharmaceutical industry in the U.S. was the strongest influence
in pushing for a 20 year patent term).
215. America and the World Trade Organization. United States Trade Representative,
supra note 86, at 2.
216. Cooper. Zimmerman & McGinley. supra note 91. at Al. A6. See alho Elliott.
supra note 58, at All (asserting that the United States government does the "dirty work-
for the pharmaceutical companies).
217. America and the World Trade Organization. United States Trade Representative.
supra note 86, at 2.
218. Id. at 5.
219. Cooper. Zimmerman & McGinley. supra note 91, at Al. A6. See also Tina Ro-
senberg. Look At Brazil. N.Y. TiNEs. Jan. 28. 2001. New York Times Magazine (recogniz-
ing that the pharmaceutical manufactures have long financed both political parties in the
United States).
220. See The United States Trade Representative. The Work of tile USTR.Intellectual
Property, supra note 61 (noting that although developing countries have transition periods
the U.S. is pushing these countries to meet the requirements of TRIPs).
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1. Arguments Supporting Enhanced Patent Protection of
Pharmaceuticals
The industrialized countries and the pharmaceutical industry assert va-
rious reasons that explain why developing countries should implement
strong patent systems.221
a. Development of New Pharmaceutical Products
Industrialized nations assert that pharmaceutical corporations need
patent protection for pharmaceutical products in order to recover re-
search and development costs, which will in turn lead to the development
of new innovations.222 The development of new drugs is expensive, im-
poses high risks, and is a time consuming process. Without patent protec-
tion, inventors would have little incentive to develop new drugs.223 If a
product is easily copied and then sold at lower prices, an inventor would
not be able to recoup costs and would be unlikely to take the time, money
or risks associated with developing a new product.224 As such, a country
with weak patent laws creates a disincentive for inventors and leads to a
decline in research and development for new medicines.225 However, ac-
cording to pharmaceutical companies, a country with patent protection
will reap the benefits of increased foreign investment, which will lead to
the research, development and production of new pharmaceuticals. 226
221. See Weissman, supra note 10, at 1086 (noting that the industry argued that en-
hanced intellectual property protection would foster economic developments in third
world countries as well as encourage foreign and domestic investment, and technology
transfer).
222. See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the Pharna-
ceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, 10
FORDHAM I.P., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 187 (1999); Peterson, supra note 40, at 278.
223. Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 222, at 208; Fisch, supra note 68, at 308. 312.
See also Mike Moore, WTO Director General, Yes, Drugs for the Poor-and Patents as Well,
M2 PRESSWIRE, Feb. 26, 2001 (asserting that because the cost of the development of a new
drug is approximately $500 million, without patents which provide rewards to the inventors
who risk millions on research the development, new drugs to treat diseases would lapse).
224. See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 222, at 215; Peterson, supra note 40, at
278; Vicente, supra note 6, at 1121.
225. See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 222.
226. See Adelman & Baldia, supra note 14, at 530 (contending that patent systems will
ensure that developing countries such as India develop a strong R&D sector, which will
lead to the creation of new drugs). Cf. Christopher S. Mayer, Notes & Comments, The
Brazilian Pharmaceutical Industry Goes Walking From Ipanema to Prosperity: Will the New
Intellectual Property Law Spur Domestic Investment?, 12 TEMP. INTr'L & CONIp. L.J. 377,
394 (1998) (outlining potential benefits that intellectual property reforms will provide to
developing countries).
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b. Increased Transfer of Technology
Developing countries will benefit from increased patent protection as
they will experience increased transfer of pharmaceutical technology and
capital investment necessary for economic growth and development. 2-'
A country with a weak patent system slows its own economic growth by
essentially creating a trade barrier against the import of new pharmaceu-
tical products.21 This leads to diminished transfer of technology and pro-
229duction capacity.
c. Increased Investment to Stimulate Domestic R&D
Patent protection encourages the development of a country's domestic
pharmaceutical industry because domestic pharmaceutical companies will
have to invest in research and development if they are prohibited from
pirating patented drugs."  Increased patent protection will also lead to
in-country retention of scientists and other innovators who might have
chosen to leave a country with weak patent law in order to gain protec-
tion for their innovation and ideas.23' Additionally, developing countries
will gain many benefits such as increased employment and education.
These benefits will be derived from the ability to educate, recruit, and
hire scientists to work a patent, and recruit and hire law\yers to protect
pharmaceutical patent rights. 232
d. Ensures the Quality of Pharmaceutical Products
A country that requires patent protection for pharmaceuticals ensures
the quality and safety of the medicines produced, and reduces the risk of
inferior quality or counterfeit drugs which create health risks.233 Coun-
tries with weak patent systems often allow the introduction of unsafe
drugs into the marketplace because there are no checks on the product
and there is little fear of liability 34
227. See Peterson. supra note 40. at 278. 281: Mayer. supra note 226. at 394; David
Benjamin Snyder, Comment. South Africa's Medicines and Related Substances Control
Amendment Act: A Spoonfid of Sugar or a Bitter Pill to Swallow?. 18 Dl-Y.. J. I 't L 175.
189 (1999): Su, supra note 5. at 204.
228. See Barfield & Groombridge. supra note 222. at 219 (noting that an in'entor will
not want to export their product to a country that would quickly copy and sell a generic
version).
229. Id. at 221.
230. See Adelman & Baldia. supra note 14. at 530: Mayer. supra note 2-2. at 399.
231. See Adelman & Baldia. supra note 14. at 533: Su. supra note 5. at 204.
232. See Tomar, supra note 14. at 602.
233. See Barfield & Groombridge. supra note 222. at 254; Peterson. supra note 40. at
279: Tomar, supra note 14. at 584: Vicente. supra note 6. at 1125.
234. See Tomar. supra note 14. at 584.
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e. Incentive for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers to Discount
Medicines for Developing Countries
Industrialized nations assert that in developing countries such as India,
the limited purchasing power of the people will act as a check on price
increases.135 Additionally, if a country provides patent protection to
pharmaceuticals, United States manufacturers and trade officials assert
that new drugs would be more effectively distributed to developing na-
tions.236 If a country protects patents, pharmaceutical companies would
be willing to sell essential medicines to developing countries at reduced
prices." 7 This assertion is supported by the fact that pharmaceutical
companies have dropped the price of certain AIDS drugs by fifty to sev-
enty-five percent for developing countries.2 38
C. Viewpoint of India and Developing Countries
The physical and economic burdens created by disease affect people in
the developing world more significantly than those in developed coun-
tries.z39 The health gap that exists between developing and developed
countries is a predominant reason that developing countries, such as In-
dia, have fought the implementation of patents on pharmaceuticals. 2 40
Because of the Indian drug consumers' reliance on the availability of ge-
neric drugs, the Indian consumers, unlike their American counterparts,
took an active role in the fight against TRIPs.241 The Indian drug con-
sumers' primary concern over patent protection has been the price in-
creases they will face.242 Keeping the price of pharmaceuticals down is of
the utmost importance, considering that a majority of India's one billion
plus people live below the poverty line. 43 India has over one million
235. See Adelman & Baldia, supra note 14, at 531. See also Koshy, supra note 25, at
para. 47 (asserting that since a majority of the people could not afford higher pharmaceuti-
cal prices their limited purchasing power will act as a self-regulating mechanism forcing
manufacturers to either have a low volume in sales or to keep costs low).
236. Cf. Snyder, supra note 227, at 189 (pointing out potential benefits to the South
African pharmaceutical patent system).
237. See Barfield & Groombridge, supra note 222, at 195.
238. Id. at 251.
239. See Press Release, World Health Organization, WTO to Address Trade and
Pharmaceuticals supra note 30. The Director of Essential Drug and Other Medicines at
WHO, stated that the inequities between developed and developing countries are striking.
Distressingly, in many of the developing countries one year's HIV treatment would con-
sume 30 years of income if purchased. See also Fidler, supra note 19, at 191.
240. See Fidler, supra note 19, at 191.
241. See Foster, supra note 26, at 308.
242. Id. at 309.
243. See Office of the Registrar General of India, supra note 23 (stating that the popu-
lation of India on March 1, 2001 was 1,012,395,934); Foster, supra note 26, at 309.
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HIV positive individuals, many of them poor and dependent on
pharmaceuticals. 24  Price increases in drugs are effectively life-threaten-
ing, particularly as many of those drugs are currently sold at prices up to
four times less than the price charged in the West. 24 5
India was a leader in fighting the implementation of an intellectual
property agreement within the GATT and was a strong voice in asserting
the need for a lengthy transition period for developing countries.246 The
Indian economy greatly improved by 1995, allowing India an improved
bargaining with the United States, a factor which explains why it has been
able to delay the implementation of the TRIPs mandated legislation.24
The American Government stands accused of conspiring to help sup-
porters in the rich and powerful American pharmaceutical industry at the
expense of millions of people who are dying of AIDS in developing coun-
tries. 48 Additionally, pharmaceutical producers from developing coun-
tries argue that the real reason drug firms from developed countries want
intellectual property law changes is to maximize their profits. This ap-
pears to be particularly true considering that during their own process of
industrialization, industrialized nations extensively used reverse engineer-
ing and methods of imitating innovative products.24 9 Only after the in-
dustrialized countries had reaped the benefits of non-protectionist
policies to their fullest extent did they close the door to developing coun-
tries, thereby restricting them and making technological progress signifi-
cantly more difficult."'
244. Foster, supra note 26, at 309.
245. See id. at 310.
246. See id. at 311-12. India ultimately signed the GATT, including TRIPs. largely
due to their economic concerns at the time. See id. at 314. Prime Minister Rao admittedly
signed the Agreement knowing that he did not have popular support for the intellectual
property provisions. Id.
247. See id. at 318. The Indian economy reached a turning point after a currency
infusion from the International Monetary Fund and measures implemented to ensure aus-
terity. Id. "[B]y 1995-96 the fiscal deficit had been lowered from 8.4% in 1990-91 to 5.6%.
while external debt service payments" in fact "'declined from 35.3% to 26.6%.- Id. Benefi-
cially, to India. during that period the economic growth rates experienced an astounding
recovery of 5.3%. Id. Additionally in 1994. India developed nuclear technology in the
form of an Intermediate range Ballistic Missile and thus the United States became more
amenable to India in order to induce it to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. See
id.
248. Boseley. supra note 147.
249. See Harbaksh Singh Nanda. India's Commnerce Minister Scores Effects of WTO
TRIPs Accord, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.. Washington D.C. (July 17, 2000). at http://
wtowatch.org/news/index.cfm?ID=2135 (on file with author).
250. See Mossinghoff. supra note 12. at 592 (indicating that, through the 1952 codifica-
tion of the U.S. Patent statute into Title 35 of the U.S. Code, the United States Congress
reversed many of the Supreme Court's anti-patent rulings); Weissman, supra note 10, at
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The fears of developing countries are not unfounded.25' Considering
that many developing countries are impoverished and have limited funds,
the need to acquire essential medicines supercedes a willingness to grant
patents that could prohibit access to pharmaceutical technology because
of monopolistic prices.252
1. Concerns of Developing Countries Regarding Patent Protection
of Pharmaceuticals
Developing countries reject many of the arguments put forth by devel-
oped nations which assert that patent protection of pharmaceuticals will
benefit developing countries. Those arguments fail to consider the di-
verse needs of developing countries and the negative impact that patent
protection will have on the development of those countries.
a. Autonomy, Sovereignty and Cultural Beliefs Undermined
Many developing countries are concerned that with the imposition of
Westernized intellectual property rights comes the return of a colonizing
factor which will result in the loss of autonomy and a developing coun-
try's sovereign right to determine its own laws.253 Such standards will
force a developing country into continued technological dependence on
1119 ("Indeed, it was through imitation that virtually every industrialized country built up
its technological capacity"). See. e.g., Sherwood, supra note 12, at 501. Notably, prior to
1970, decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court contained statements that
patents are monopolies. Id. In recent years, the Court has shifted its condemnation and
instead refers to patents as offering "rent seeking opportunities." Id. See also Su, supra
note 5, at 200 (discussing the doctrine of uneven development in which the developed
countries industrialized at the expense of developing countries and have not since allowed
developing countries the opportunity to advance); Nanda, supra note 249 (voicing concerns
of Indian Commerce Minister Maran).
251. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., The TRIPs Agreement and Developing
Countries, 25 U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/1, U.N. Sales No. 96 II.D.10 (1996) (observing
that most of the immediate benefits of TRIPs will accrue to the industrialized countries).
252. Cf. McCabe, supra note 9, at 52-53. Many developing countries argue that patent
protection allows industrialized countries to stay ahead in the technological sector. Id.
This ensures that transfer of technology is denied to the developing countries, which might
use such a transfer to begin their own research and development process. Id. at 53. This in
turn affects a developing country's ability to develop self-sustaining pharmaceutical indus-
try. Id. at 53. Cf. Wechkin, supra note 38, at 237 (noting that some argue the high prices
which result from the monopolistic power of patents will result in a reduction of availabil-
ity of essential medicines).
253. See Tomar, supra note 14, at 583 (noting the fear that India may be returned to
dependent nation status if it complies with the TRIPs Agreement); Smith, supra note 27. at
214, 234 (asserting that the standards of intellectual property protection appear to be dic-
tated from the West); Vicente, supra note 6, at 1127 (arguing that the drug industry's argu-
ments supporting enhanced intellectual property are one sided and prevent the natural
expression of national sovereignty).
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industrialized countries, prevent them from acting as participants, and de-
ter development." 4 Developing nations assert that intellectual property
protection should be established only if it is consistent with their own
needs, not those of multinational corporations or the industrialized coun-
tries. 55 Thus, in the case of pharmaceuticals, patent protection is viewed
as only in the self-interest of the developed nations who wish to protect
their profits." 6 Developed countries advance increased intellectual prop-
erty protection because they will receive the primary benefits through
their exports.25 7
This view is fostered by the fact that Western-imposed views on intel-
lectual property rights are inconsistent with the cultural belief that knowl-
edge is viewed as the common heritage of mankind, found in many
developing countries.25
8
b. Research and Development: New Drugs for the Affluent,
Infectious Diseases for the Poor
The major pharmaceutical companies, backed by industrialized nations,
argue that patent protection for pharmaceuticals allows their companies
to invest in the research and development of new drugs to treat infectious
diseases found predominately in developing countries. 2 9 Does R&D de-
pend on twenty year patent monopolies to charge exorbitant prices-not
254. See Smith. supra note 27. at 231. Cf Todd M. Rowe. Comment. Global Technol.
ogy Protection, Moving Past the Treaty. 4 MARO. INTEu. PRoi'. L Rtv. 107. 112. (2Ut0)
(explaining that India is a country "rich in technical potential" but that any technological
progress must encompass the unique cultural perspective, found in many developing na-
tions, which take a community approach to property).
255. See Sarma. supra note 4. at 135. See also Rowe, supra note 254, at 111 (asserting
developing countries should not be pressured to adopt Western intellectual property
systems).
256. Cf. Su. supra note 5. at 205 (speaking broadly to the impact of intellectual
property).
257. See McCabe, supra note 9. at 53-54. Intellectual property provides the most ben-
efits to countries with market based economies which can rely on private capital and open
trade, a system which many developing countries do not have. Id. at 54. See Peterson.
supra note 40. at 280.
258. See D'Amato & Long. C'ommnon Heritage of Mankind. supra note 40. at 61. See
generally Theresa Beeby Lewis. Comment. Patent Protection for the Pharmnaceutcal Ius.
try: A Survey of the Patent Laws of Various Countries. 30 Nli't LA\v. 835. 839 (1996)
(describing the belief held by developing countries that knowledge and thus intellectual
property is common property): Rowe. supra note 254. at 123 (commenting on developing
countries community approach to development): Smith, supra note 27, at '24-28 (illustrat-
ing that there exists a misalignment between developing and developed countries as to the
cultural and social attitude on the sharing of intellectual property).
259. See Adelman & Baldia. supra note 14. at 530: Vicente, supra note 6. at 1132:
Elliott. supra note 58, at All.
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likely.26° None of the pharmaceutical companies really depend on
achieving profits in developing countries, which generally only account
for a minimal percentage of drug sales world-wide. 61 This argument fails
to acknowledge that, in fact, of the money used towards R&D, only ten
percent is used to develop drugs that account for ninety percent of the
world's diseases in developing countries. 262 Ninety percent of R&D, is
actually spent on providing treatments for the affluent, such as diet drugs,
or impotency drugs such as Viagra.263 Because infectious diseases are
found predominately in developing countries, they have not been a prior-
ity for the pharmaceutical industry.26 The industry already focuses pri-
marily on developing drugs for the consumers in rich industrialized
countries rather than essential drugs.265 Treatment for diseases such as
tuberculosis, malaria,266 and AIDS, those common in developing coun-
tries, would continue to be ignored. 67
The industry asserts that they lose too much money in countries that do
not provide patent protection because their drugs are pirated.268 This ar-
gument is also lacking. It fails to consider the fact that prior to the TRIPs
Agreement, the profit margins of the pharmaceutical corporations were
high enough to foster R&D, even in the face of generic copies in develop-
ing countries.269 These claims of piracy are exaggerated and the losses
suffered by the major pharmaceutical corporations are overstated.270 Be-
cause of the high cost of patented pharmaceuticals, consumers in devel-
oping countries would never have been able to purchase the patented
260. Rosenberg, supra note 219.
261. See id. For example Africa only accounts for 1.3% of pharmaceutical sales. Id.
Additionally, even if the pharmaceutical companies sold their drugs at substantial dis-
counts, they would still profit. Id.
262. See Elliott, supra note 58, at All.
263. Id.
264. See Vicente, supra note 6, at 1132. See generally Elliott, supra note 58, at All.
265. See Vicente, supra note 6, at 1132.
266. WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999, supra note 19, at xii. This report recognized that
malaria and underdevelopment are closely intertwined. Id. Over 40% of the world's popu-
lation live where there is a risk of malaria a disease which imposes premature death and
suffering and causes severe economic retardation. Id. Malaria flourishes in situations of
social and environmental crisis, weak health systems and disadvantaged communities. Id.
267. See id. at 13-17; Optimism About Malaria Vaccine Grows, USA TODAY, (Dec. 3,
1999), available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/health/general/Ihgenl90.htm (last visited
Dec. 3, 1999).
268. Vicente, supra note 6, at 1129.
269. See Elliott, supra note 58, at All. Additionally, much of the money that the
pharmaceutical companies claim goes to R&D is also spent on marketing drugs. See id.
270. See Vicente, supra note 6, at 1129.
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By allowing the production of generic medicines through compulsory
licenses, a developing country is enabled to stimulate economic develop-
ment while gaining access to essential medicines. 27 2 A local industry that
exists without patent protection will better serve national health needs in
poor countries than high cost brand name pharmaceuticals. -7"
c. Medication for the Nation: Access to Essential Medicines
Denied
Developing countries cannot afford the cost of maintaining a strong
intellectual property regime.2 74 The continued push of patent protection
on pharmaceuticals places an unreasonable burden on the ability of de-
veloping countries to access essential drugs. 27" In light of this it is in the
public interest to allow an exception to intellectual property protection in
the area of pharmaceuticals for developing countries. 2T7 ' As developing
countries have limited resources, it is inappropriate to apply them to the
271. See id. at 1130.
272. Cf. McCabe, supra note 9. at 56. McCabe explains that a developing country
needs to be able to stimulate economic growth before a country can afford to implement a
strong intellectual property system. Id. Additionally, he notes that developing countries'
economic growth is actually fueled by pirating patented drugs. hi. Consequently. if devel-
oping countries are unable to maintain generic industries that cop), pirated drugs, they will
realize a reduction in domestic output and an increase in unemployment rates. hi. Ge-
nericlpirate companies will likely choose to establish their business in countries %%tthout
strict intellectual property protection. Id. This will in fact hurt a developing country rather
than provide the benefits espoused by developed countries. Id. Set, also Wechkin. supra
note 38, at 240 (noting that compulsory licensing provides a way in which developing coun-
tries can simultaneously develop medicines and a pharmaceutical manufacturing industry
without the prohibitive costs associated with independent research and development).
273. See Vicente, supra note 6. at 1132.
274. See McCabe, supra note 9, at 54 (discussing the fact that most de eloping coun-
tries do not have ready access to private capital and thus a strong intellectual property
regime creates an increased financial burden on developing countries). Cf Lewis. supra
note 258, at 835 (fearing price increases and loss of control over technological develop-
ment, developing countries view the grant of intellectual property with skepticism): Row'e,
supra note 254, at 131 (asserting that intellectual property protections modeled on the
United States system would be useless for developing nations which do not have sufficient
resources to provide their citizens with basic necessities such as health care. education.
food and clothing).
275. WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999. supra note 19. at 13. See Fidler. supra note 19. at
210.
276. See Vicente, supra note 6. at 1133-34 (asserting that an exception to patent policy'
in the area of pharmaceuticals for developing countries' health interests should be allowed
in the public interest). Cf. Smith, supra note 27. at 248 (indicating that public interest
exceptions have been allowed under TRIPs).
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protection of monopolistic foreign owned pharmaceutical patents, as the
health needs of the people should take precedence. 7  Industrialized
countries have vast resources and thus do not experience the same finan-
cial strain that a developing country would experience by having to im-
plement an elaborate patent system.278
More importantly, as it relates to patenting of pharmaceuticals,
medicines will become unaffordable to the general populace and thus
patent protection acts to prohibit widespread access.2 79 For developing
countries, providing patent protection to drugs will provide little benefit
to their poverty stricken citizens.28° Patents provide monopolies that re-
sult in high drug prices and high health care costs, which is an unfair bur-
den to impose on poor developing countries.281
Recently, the pharmaceutical companies have begun to offer their
brand name drugs at reduced prices, however, the drugs produced at
cheaper prices are still unaffordable to the world's poor and more expen-
sive than the generic alternatives.2 82
d. Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals Will Cause the Death
of the National Pharmaceutical Industry to the Benefit
of Multinational Corporations
In the early 1950s when India was still guided by a British style patent
system, eighty to ninety percent of Indian patents were owned by non-
Indians and less than ten percent of patents were actually worked in In-
dia.283 Since India implemented weaker patent laws, Indian companies
277. Cf. McCabe, supra note 9, at 55 (speaking broadly on intellectual property); Vi-
cente, supra note 6, at 1133 (discussing monopoly pricing as a factor affecting public
health); Rowe, supra note 254, at 133 (emphasizing that requiring developing nations to
provide patent protection to drugs would be absurd as their would be minimal benefits to
their poverty-stricken populations).
278. See Rowe, supra note 254, at 133. See, e.g., Vicente, supra note 6, at 1132. Even
in developed countries when patent protection is imposed the price of medicines increases.
Id. In Canada, the cost of pharmaceuticals increased by fifty-three percent, five years after
the government adopted patent laws consistent with United States demands. Id. For a
developing country such a scenario is potentially disastrous.
279. See Tomar, supra note 14, at 601. Tomar notes that patent protection will de-
crease drugs available and increase prices because the cost associated with research and
development will fall upon consumers. See id. In developing countries such as India, the
poor people will be unable to afford them. See id. See also Lewis, supra note 258, at 839
(expressing that debate over the patent protection of pharmaceuticals involves social con-
siderations such as the desire to keep health care costs low). Cf. Koshy, supra note 25, at
para. 36 (discussing the fears of critics of patent protection on pharmaceuticals).
280. Rowe, supra note 254, at 133.
281. See Vicente, supra note 6, at 1118; Wechkin, supra note 38, at 237.
282. See Elliott, supra note 58, at All.
283. Adelman & Baldia, supra note 14, at 518.
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manufacture between seventy and eighty-five percent of drugs in the do-
mestic market.' Weak patent laws have allowed India to enter pharma-
ceutical markets, reversing the trend of the past where large foreign
multinational companies, owned by Europeans and the United States,
dominated India's pharmaceutical industry.' 5
If patent protection is provided to pharmaceuticals, patents will be held
by foreigners and not worked in the developing country, thus giving mul-
tinational corporations a controlled monopoly.2 ' Jobs will be displaced
in the national drug sector.- Developing nations such as Brazil, India
and Thailand, which have developed the ability to produce generic copies
of brand name drugs at lower prices, will not only see a drop in affordable
medicines, they will see a large job creating local industry disappear.'
e. The Promised Transfer of Technology and Stimulation of
Domestic Research and Development Will Never Be
Realized
Increased intellectual property protection will cause the economic gap
between developed and developing countries to grow wider.2  A tighter
regulated patent system prevents a transfer of technology and denies de-
veloping countries the opportunity to create their own research and de-
velopment in the pharmaceutical industry. 2'° The local pharmaceutical
284. See i. at 527: Koshy, supra note 25. at para. 23.
285. See Tomar, supra note 14, at 582-83.
286. See Adelman & Baldia, supra note 14. at 530 (summarizing the Indian fears sur-
rounding the implementation of pharmaceutical patents): Tomar. supra note 14. at 582
(remarking that this is particularly troubling as developing nations already are behind de-
veloped nations in the creation of inventions): Koshy. supra note 25. at para. 37 (discussing
the concern that multinational corporations will lead to the end of the domestic pharma-
ceutical market).
287. See Adelman & Baldia. supra note 14, at 530 (discussing the Indian fear regard-
ing the adoption of patents for pharmaceuticals). See also Mayer, supra note 226, at 394
(providing that developing countries would experience loss of firms that had copied drugs
under a weakened patent law system).
288. Cf. Adelman & Baldia. supra note 14. at 530 (speaking specifically about con-
cerns of job displacement in India with the implementation of pharmaceutical patents);
Mayer, supra note 226, at 394.
289. See Rowe, supra note 254, at 136.
290. See McCabe, supra note 9, at 53. See also Peterson, supra note 40, at 280 (noting
that the vast majority of patents are issued to inventors from developed countnes)- LeUis,
supra note 258, at 839 (asserting that technology transfer is more important to developing
countries than encouraging innovation): Rowe. supra note 254. at 135 (finding that an in-
tellectual property system based on a western model is not justified by the minimal techno-
logical advancement that developing nations would receive). Cf. Su. supra note 5, at 205
(noting that intellectual property protection mechanisms act as an obstacle to the transfer
of technology and impedes development).
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industry, which produces generic drugs at lower prices than patent own-
ers, creates a demand which stimulates domestic production, and in turn
leads to competition and economic development within the developing
country.291 Notably though, most industrialized, technologically ad-
vanced countries now maintain and advance strong intellectual property
protection, "virtually every industrialized country adopted strong patent
laws [only] after developing their technological infrastructure, in signifi-
cant part through copying strategies. ''2 1 Currently, developing countries
that have not imposed stringent patent system have proven to be more
innovative in the development of their technology capability, than devel-
oping countries that have strictly applied patent systems. 293 A patent sys-
tem cannot provide what most developing countries need: a science or
technology infrastructure as provided through a system of advanced edu-
cation and research. 294 Rather than rely on industrialized countries for
technology transfer, developing countries must be allowed to undertake
their own research and development initiatives to stimulate their own do-
mestic growth.
D. A New Precedent: A South African Victory for All Developing
Countries
South Africa became the subject of world attention shortly after it en-
acted the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act,
No.90 of 1997.295 The legislation, signed by President Nelson Mandela,
authorized the use of compulsory licensing of generic medicines and the
purchase of more affordable medicines through parallel imports, in an
291. See Peterson, supra note 40, at 280. See also Weissman, supra note 10, at 1119
(noting that weak or non-existent patent protection on pharmaceuticals has allowed India,
Argentina and Turkey to develop flourishing pharmaceutical industries).
292. Weissman, supra note 10, at 1119 (footnote omitted).
293. See id. at 1123.
294. See id. at 1124.
295. M~decins Sans Fronti~res, Background Information: South Africa Medicines Law
(Act 90) and Access to Medicines, [hereinafter Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Background In-
formation: South Africa Medicines Law], at http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May
21, 2001) (on file with author). See Martine Bulard, Apartheid of Pharmacology, L[
MONDE DIPOLOMATIQUE, Jan. 2000, available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with author); Letter from MSF to Commissioner Pascal Lamny re:
South Africa, (Mar. 5, 2001) (written by Morten Rostrup, President of M~decins Sans
Fronti~res International Council) [hereinafter Letter from MSF to Commissioner Pascal
Lamy], available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21, 2001) (on file with
author). See also Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley, supra note 91, at Al, A6 (explaining
that the South African Ministry of Health asserts that the legislation reflects the govern-
ments' assertion that equal access to health care is a constitutionally protected right).
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attempt to find a solution to the lack of access to affordable medicines.2 "'
Because of the high cost of drugs, very few South Africans have access to
the same drugs that greatly extend lives in the developed world. 2" The
AIDS epidemic has created a serious health concern.2  In Africa
twenty-two million people are infected with the AIDS virus, comprising
65% of all people infected world wide. 2 " In South Africa more than 4.3
296. Steve Sternberg. Victims Lost in Battle Over Drug Patents, USA Frl) -'N. Sept, 15.
1999. See Long & D'Amato, The AIDS Drugs Controversy. supra note 127. at 12th; Paul
Benkimoun, WTO's Impact on Third World Health Eyed. AIDS. Seattle, and the, health
Exception, WORLD NEWS CONNE )NAVORU) Ri- i-oR iR. Dec. 1. 1999. avalalble at http:
/www.accessmed-msLorg (last visited Feb. 26. 2001) (on file with author)- Rosenberg. supra
note 219: Ed Vulliamy. How Drug Giants Let Millions Die of AIDS. Tin Otisl R1 it. Dec.
19, 1999, available at http://wvw.accessmed-msf.org (last visited Feb. 26, 201 I) (on file %%ith
author): Open Letter to Commissioner Pascal Lamny (Tradte. European ('omnnission. (Feb.
12, 2001) (written by Morten Rostrup. President of Mt1decins Sans Frontieres International
Council), [hereinafter Open Letter to Commissioner Pascal Lamnl. available at http"
www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21. 2001) (on file with author): Open Letter to
Members of the European Parliamnent re: South Africa Medicine- Act (Feb. 26. 20011 (pre-
pared by M~decins Sans Fronti~res). [hereinafter Open Letter to Metbers of the European
Parliament], available at http://www%%v.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21. 2UUl (on file
with author): Open Letter to 39 Pharmaceutical Companies re: South Africa Medicines At
(Feb. 22, 2001) (prepared by M6decins Sans Frontitres & Oxfam-Great Britain) [hereinat-
ter Open Letter to 39 Pharmaceutical Companies], available at http:-//iw.accessmed-
msf.org (last visited May 21. 2001) (on file with author): Press Release. Medecins Sans
Fronti~res, Drop the Case! Support the Struggle for Medicines in South Africa (Mar. 8.
2001) [hereinafter Press Release, Mfdecins Sans Frontitres. Drop the Case!]. aitalable at
http://wwv.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21. 2001) (on file with author). See also
Mddecins Sans Fronti~res. Background Information: South Africa M Iedicine- Law. Nupra
note 295. The clause of the Act which caused the most debate was Section 15C. hi. It
permits the parallel importation of medicines, which would allow South Africa to shop
around for the lowest world price on patented products. ld. This would mean that it a
patent holder sells a product for a lower price in India than in South Africa. the cheaper
drugs sold in India could be imported to South Africa. hi. Additionally Section 15C al-
lows the Minister of Health to override patent protection by issuing compulsory licenses in
order to facilitate access to necessary medicines. Id. This allows the use of a patented
product without the consent of the patent holder. ld. The TRIPs Agreement allows in
Article 31 for compulsory licensing in the case of national emergencies or to remed% anti-
competitive practices. Id. See generally Cooper. Zimmerman & McGinley, supra note 91.
at Al, A6. Parallel importing allows an importing country to buy drugs from the cheapest
available source whether the original patent holder gives permission or not. hi. Compul-
sory licensing allows a government to license local manufacturers to produce copies ot
pharmaceuticals, to be sold at cheap prices, whose patents are held by toreign
corporations.
297. 40 Drug Companies Take Government to High Court over Generic Drugs3 Plan.
AFRICAN NEWS SERVICE. Mar. 2. 2001.
298. See Snyder, supra note 227. at 176 (noting that in addition to the AIDS cases
South Africans also fall victims to other diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis).
299. See Bulard, supra note 295. The devastating fact is that AIDS related deaths in
Africa will exceed the 20 million victims of the European plague. hL See Rosenberg, supra
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million people have HIV, which is more than any other country in the
world.3" The proportion of the population that can afford the high
priced medicine is extremely small, and the vast majority of people in-
fected with AIDS cannot afford treatments.3 °t The use of generic drugs
over brand name drugs has resulted in substantially lower prices, thus
increasing access.302 Many developing countries and non-governmental
organizations, such as Mrdecins Sans Fronti~res (MSF) and Oxfam, sup-
ported South Africa's legislation as TRIPs compliant, in accordance with
the provisions on parallel imports and compulsory licenses.30 3 The TRIPs
Agreement, by remaining silent on parallel imports, in Article 6, and by
authorizing compulsory licenses under certain conditions for health emer-
gencies, in Article 31, allows for countries to protect public health
concerns.
30 4
note 219; Companies Agree to Cut Prices of HIV Drugs in Poor Nations, MEDICAL INDtJS-
TRY TODAY, May 12, 2000; Steve Sternberg, Activists Discount Big Drugmakers' Gifts,
USA TODAY, Jul. 11, 2000.
300. Mddecins Sans Frontirres, Background Information: South Africa Medicines
Law, supra note 295.
301. Id.
302. See 40 Drug Companies Take Government to High Court over Generic Drugs
Plan, supra note 297. See also Claire Keeton, S. African Government and Drug Giants in
Court over Medicine Prices, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 4, 2001. The production of
generic medicines locally or through parallel imports of drugs will lead to cheaper prices.
Id. Brazil and India have both offered resources to help manufacture cheaper generic
drugs, Brazil through technology transfer and India by supplying raw materials. Id.
303. See Press Release, Mddecins Sans Frontires, Pharmaceutical Industry Must Stop
Obstructing Access to Medicine in South Africa (Mar. 1, 2001), available at http:/
www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21, 2001) (on file with author). Cf. Snyder, supra
note 227. at 182 (reviewing the fact that South Africa signed the TRIPs Agreement and
changed its domestic laws in order to fully comply). See also M6decins Sans Fronti&rcs,
Background Information: South Africa Medicines Law, supra note 295 (providing that the
TRIPs Agreement states that parallel importation cannot be subject to challenge at the
WTO as countries are free to decide for themselves the extent of parallel importation they
can allow in their national laws). See generally (Response) Letter from European Commis-
sioner Pascal Lamy re: South Africa, (Mar. 2, 2001) (written by Pascal Lamy, European
Commissioner), [hereinafter (Response) Letter from European Commissioner Pascal
Lamy], available at http://wvw.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21, 2001) (on file with
author); Open Letter to Members of the European Parliament, supra note 296.
304. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra notes 166 &
164, art. 6, 31; Gavin Yamey, Agencies Urge End to Global Trade Restrictions on Essential
Medicines, BRITISH MEDICAL JoURNAL, Dec. 2, 1999, available at http://www.accessmed-
msf.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with author); (Response) Letter from European
Commissioner Pascal Lamy, supra note 303. See also Snyder, supra note 227, at 197 (clari-
fying that the laws do not abrogate patent rights but in fact simply provides the Health
Minister with the power to authorize parallel imports in accord with TRIPs); Mdecins
Sans Frontires, PETITION: Drop the Case! Support the Struggle for Medicines in South
Africa, (Mar. 2001) [hereinafter PETITION: Drop the Case] (noting that the legislation is
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The legislation came under sharp criticism from the United States, its
drug industry and the European Community.3"5 Both the United States
government and the European Union supported the pharmaceutical com-
panies' argument that the Act was a violation of the TRIPs agreement
and placed pressure on South Africa to drop the Act."3 ' On February 18,
1998, a suit was brought against the Government of South Africa. by
forty-two 30 7 pharmaceutical manufacturers alleging that the Act was un-
consistent with South Africa's obligations as a member of the WTO). available at http:/
www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21. 2001) (on file with author).
305. See Long & D'Amato. Introduction: A Trip Begins. supra note 14, at 7 (noting
that South Africa's attempt to "circumvent" its patent regime has led to heated debates
over the role of patent protection in the medical community): Snyder. supra note 227. at
177 (explaining that the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufactures stated
they would retaliate against South Africa by withholding new drugs unless South Africa
changed the legislation). See Boseley. supra note 147: Donald G. McNeil Jr.. As Devastat-
ing Epidemics Increase, Nations Take on Drug Companies. N.Y. Tisii %, Jul. 9. 2U0, avata.
ble at http://wvw.accessmed-msf.org (last visited Feb. 26. 2001) (on file with author):
Vulliamy. supra note 296: Open Letter to Commissioner Pascal Laniv. 3upra note 296;
Trade: U.S. to Consider Poor Countries' Need for Drugs. Health Cart' Call for End to
Trade Pressures in Health-Related Disputes. Tiii FNANCaIAt Tit s, Dec. 3. l ,M). avaihble
at http:l/www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited Feb. 26. 2001) (on file vitth author).
306. See Mddecins Sans Fronti~res. Background I,:fornatton: South Africa MedicineS
Law, supra note 295. See also Snyder. supra note 227. at 177 (reporting that in reaction to
the new law USTR Charlene Barshefsky placed South Africa on the Watch List for coun-
tries which fail to adequately protect intellectual propertN ).
307. Three companies withdrew from the suit leaving only 39 pharmaceutical compa-
nies. See Open Letter to 39 Pharmaceutical Companies. supra note 29h. The 39 companies
who brought suit are:
The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association of South Africa; Alcon Laboratories
(S.A.) (Proprietary) Limited: Bayer (Proprietary) Limited: Bristol-.Myers Squibb
(Proprietary) Limited: Byk Madaus (Proprietary) Limited: Eli Lilly (South Africa)
(Proprietary) Limited: Glaxo Wellcome (South Africa) (Proprietary) Limited;
Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited: Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (Proprietary) Limited;
Janssen-Cilag Pharmaceutical (Proprietary) Limited: Knoll Pharmaceuticals South Af-
rica (Proprietary) Limited: Lundbeck South Africa (Proprietary) Limited; Merck
(Proprietary) Limited: MSD (Proprietary) Limited: Novartis South Africa (Propne-
tary) Limited: Novo Nordisk (Proprietary) Limited: Pharmacia & Upjohn (Proprie-
tary) Limited: Rhone-Poulenc Rorer South Africa (Proprietary) Limited: Roche
Products (Proprietary) Limited; Schering (Proprietary) Limited; Schering-Plough
(Proprietary) Limited: S.A. Scientific Pharmaceuticals (Proprietary) Limited;
SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (Proprietary) Limited; Universal Pharmaceuti-
cals (Proprietary) Limited: Wyeth (Proprietary) Limited: Xixia Pharmaceuticals (Pro-
prietary) Limited: Zeneca South Africa (Proprietary) Limited: Bayer AG;
Boehringer-Ingelheim International GmbH: Boehringer-lngelheim KG: Bristol-Myers
Squibb Company: Byk Gulden Lomberg Chemische Fabrik GmbH: Dr. Karl Thomae
GmbH: Eli Lilly and Company: F. Hoffman-La Roche AG: Merck KgaA; Merck &
Co., Inc.: Rhone-Poulenc Rorer S.A.: SmithKline Beechman,
Id. See Press Release. Mddecins Sans Frontiires. NGOs Denounce the Lack of Trans-
parency in Multi-national UNAIDS ARV Drug Deal for Kenya: NGOS act to Treat Pa-
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constitutional.3"' Harvey Bale, the director general of the International
Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers stated the industry must
pursue the suit because the industry must protect pharmaceutical patents
as "the foundation of research and development." 30 9 Additionally, the
pharmaceutical industry asserts that treating AIDS or other diseases that
are prevalent in developing countries cannot be solved by attacking phar-
maceutical prices. 310 Rather the industry asserts that ensuring access to
medicines involves issues other than price such as health care infrastruc-
ture, providing proper care and treatment, lack of computers and institut-
ing distribution systems. 311 The lawsuit imposed an injunction on the
implementation of the Act.312 In the three years since the legislation was
under injunction, over 400, 000 South Africans have died of AIDS, most
tients and Call on Big Pharmaceutical Companies to Lower Prices as Promised (Feb. 21,
2001), available at http://www.accessmed-msf.orglmsflaccessmed/reports/2001/02 (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with author); Press Release, Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Pharma-
ceutical Industry Must Stop Obstructing Access to Medicine in South Africa, supra note
303.
308. See Rosenberg, supra note 219; Vulliamy, supra note 296; Indian Firm Offers
AIDS Cocktail for $1 a Day, REUTERS, Feb. 9, 2001, available at http://www.accessmed-
msf.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with author); Open Letter to Commissioner
Pascal Lamy, supra note 296; Press Release, Mddecins Sans Frontires, Drop the Case!,
supra note 296. See also Sarah Boseley, Struggle for Cheap Medicines: AIDS Drugs War
Between the Big Firms and the Poor Countries, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 27, 1999 (noting that
when the South African government tried to produce AIDS medications cheaply and allow
parallel imports from countries which produce them cheaply, they were met with a law-
suit), available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with
author); Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley, supra note 91, at Al, A6 (asserting that the
industry felt the law was unconstitutional because it gave the South African health minister
power to neglect the country's patent laws).
309. Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley, supra note 91, at Al, A6.
310. ld. See Keeton, supra note 302.
311. See Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley, supra note 91, at Al, A6.
312. See id. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., South Africa's Bitter Pill for World's Drug
Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998 Sec.3, at 1; Sternberg, supra note 296; Press Release,
Joint MSF/Oxfam, 29 Drug Companies versus South Africa: People Die for Lack of Af-
fordable Drugs as Inhumane Industry Ignores Reality (Mar. 5, 2001), [hereinafter Press
Release, Joint MSF/Oxfam, 29 Drug Companies versus South Africa], available at http://
www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21, 2001) (on file with author); Press Release.
M6decins Sans Fronti res, Voices Around the World Condemn Drug Industry Hypocrisy:
New Evidence Shows Why Industry Legal Arguments Don't Stack Up (Apr. 17, 2001)
[hereinafter Press Release, Voices Around the World Condemn Drug Industry Hypocrisy],
available at http://vww.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21, 2001) (on file with author).
See also Press Release, M~decins Sans Fronti~res, Voices of People Living with HIV to be
Heard by South African Court: MSF Welcomes Judge's Decision to Accept Amicus Brief
(Mar. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Press Release, Voices of People Living with HIV to be Heard
by South African Court] (noting that the legislation has now been blocked from coming
into force for three years), available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21,
2001) (on file with author).
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of whom were unable to acquire affordable treatments.3" During that
time major pharmaceutical companies closed their South African facto-
ries.314 South African Health Minister. Dr. Nkosasana Zuma stated that
the change in law was a fight for people who need medicine."' Dr. Zuma
asserted that governments must be able to buy medicines cheaply in or-
der to distribute them to the poor.3t ' For South Africa the fight with the
multi-nationals is a consequence of the real fight to save the lives of mil-
lions who are dying of AIDS. 317
While the pharmaceutical industry has been trying to improve its im-
age, so as to be viewed as helping fight the AIDS crisis, they staunchly
resist diminished patent protection. 3" For the industry, suing a poor na-
tion, that is trying to acquire copied generic drugs due to their inability to
afford brand name drugs, is legitimized by the belief that the industry
must protect patents.' The industry is particularly concerned that if the
South African legislation stands, other poor countries will embody similar
legislation.3 2° Additionally, the industry is concerned that if developing
nations are permitted to buy cheaper generic drugs, American consumers
will demand the same.32' When the lawsuit was filed it had the support of
the United States government, which had once again named South Africa
to the Special 301 Watch List, and continued to pressure South Africa to
prevent the use of compulsory licensing and parallel imports. '2, Addi-
tionally, European Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, stated that the Commu-
nity supported intellectual property protection through a full
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement to be essential for investment
in R&D for medicines to protect against serious diseases.' -' Thus the
313. Press Release. Mdecins Sans Frontires. Drop the Case!. 5upra note 29tb.
314. See McNeil Jr.. supra note 312. at 1. Bristol-Myers Squibb. Pharmacia & UpJohn
and Eli Lilly shut down in South Africa after the legislation was imposed. Id.
315. See id. The South African law now provides that pharmacists must tell their cus-
tomers when a cheaper generic products exists and must sell that medicine to the patient if
desired. Id.
316. See id.: Sternberg. supra note 296. Cf. Snyder. supra note 227. at 185 (noting that
Dr. Zuma has also stated that the law's intent is not to provide her with a power to elimi-
nate all pharmaceutical patent rights).
317. See McNeil Jr.. supra note 312. at 1.
318. See Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley. supra note 91. at Al. Ab.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See id. (noting that pharmaceutical companies derive an annual profit of S126
billion from the United States market).
322. See id.: McNeil Jr., supra note 305: McNeil Jr.. supra note 312. at l; Vulhamy,
supra note 296: Yamey. supra note 304: Open Letter to Conmissioner PAscal Lamnv, supra
note 296.
323. (Response) Letter from European Conntsstoner Pascal Laun', supra note 3U3.
This letter presented a response to the request of Mddecins Sans Frontitres to show full
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Commissioner chose not to withdraw the statement of previous Commis-
sioner Sir Leon Brittan condemning the legislation.
32 4
Activists in the United States brought public attention to the continued
pressure of the United States on South Africa to modify the Medicines
Act.3 25 While the United States Trade Representative's office has long
been a supporter of the industry's position on non-patented drugs, in the
face of the growing controversy about the spread of disease in developing
countries and the extreme price of drugs, they can no longer stand firmly
behind the industry.32 6 In September, 1999 the United States dropped
the threat of sanctions on South Africa in light of its attempt to deal with
the AIDS Epidemic.3 "7 Both the United States and the European Union
softened their position in light of the public protest?28 Notably, in early
May of 2000, USTR Charelene Barshefsky supported the signing of an
support for actions to promote access to medicines. Id. The Commissioner declined to
withdraw a previous letter of the Commission that had criticized the enactment of South
Africa's Act. Id. In the same breath though, the Commissioner stated that the Community
would not take a position in matters that were within the internal constitutional affairs of
South Africa. Id.
324. See Boseley, supra note 308 (noting that in March 1998, Sir Leon Brittan former
European commissioner warned that legislation allowing parallel imports negatively af-
fects the European pharmaceutical industry); see also (Response) Letter front European
Commissioner Pascal Lamy, supra note 303. But see Letter front MSF to Commissioner
Pascal Lamy, supra note 295 (noting that the Commission had previously taken a stand on
behalf of the pharmaceutical companies at the onset of the court case).
325. See Boseley, supra note 308; Vivian Hoffmann, Health Groups Say Poor Nations
Need Access to Generic Drugs, Bos rON GLOBE, Nov. 27, 1999, available at http://
www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with author). See also 40 Drug
Companies Take Government to High Court over Generic Drugs Plan, supra note 297.
ACT UP activists demanded that the Pharmaceutical Companies drop the lawsuit, stop
blocking access to cheaper generic drugs, allow for compulsory licenses, and discontinue
patent extensions. Id. Additionally, ACT UP demanded the Bush Administration, con-
demn the lawsuit, drop the V/TO dispute with Brazil, and clarify that the U.S. govern-
ment's policy towards impoverished countries is not limited to sub-Saharan African
countries, and AIDS antiretroviral medication. Id.
326. See Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley, supra note 91, at Al, A6. This is an ex-
tremely unusual stance from the government who has long received financial support from
the drug industry in election campaigns. Id. In the most recent election the industry spent
$80 million to help elect President Bush and the Republicans. Id.
327. See Rosenberg, supra note 219; Trade: U.S. to Consider Poor Countries' Need For
drugs. Health Care: Call for End to Trade Pressures in Health-Related Disputes, supra note
305. See also Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley, supra note 91, at Al, A6 (explaining that
the Clinton administration decision to stop pressing South Africa to change the legislation
is also supported by the Bush administration); Vulliamy, supra note 296; (noting that Al
Gore about turned and stated that he was not afraid to stand up to the pharmaceutical
industry).
328. Mddecins Sans Fronti~res, Background Information: South Africa Medicines
Law, supra note 295.
[Vol. 3:339
2001] EXAMINATION OF THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSFRY 397
Executive Order to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa.329 The
Executive Order, while a positive step. was restricted to sub-Saharan Af-
rica, ignoring the plight of the poor in other developing countries.'
In late February of 2001, the Bush administration through the USTR
issued a statement that indicated it will make the need to protect
America's investment in intellectual property consistent with the need to
work with countries to develop programs to treat the AIDS crisis."'
However the loss of support from the government did not deter the phar-
maceutical companies.33 - Despite the consistent opposition to pharma-
ceutical patents by international aid agencies such as Oxfam and
Mrdecins Sans Fronti~res. stating that access to affordable medicines
would save lives if the legislation was permitted, the pharmaceutical cor-
porations continued to attack South Africa over the law."3 The health
needs of poor countries must be a priority even if it means violating drug
patents.334
The lawsuit began at the High Court in Pretoria. South Africa on
March 5, 2001. 3"' On the second day of hearings before the South Afri-
329. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Represenative. uSTR Bar-
shefsky Welcomes HIV/AIDS Executive Order. (May 10. 2000) (noting that the order pro-
vides a proper balance between the need to ensure that intellectual property rights are
protected and the needs of African countries are protected in the face of the AIDS crisis),
available at www.ustr.gov (on file with author). See also Sternberg. supra note 296. Prest-
dent Clinton issued the order to make inexpensive drugs and medical technologies availa-
ble to AIDS ravaged Africa. Id. The order provides that the U.S. government %%ill not
impose restrictive intellectual property rights on pharmaceuticals needed to provide access
to HIV drugs. Id.
330. See Thalif Deen. Health: Cheaper Aids Drugs a Myth. Says Medical Atid Ag'en,
IN-,aR PRESS SERVICE, May 11, 2000. In December of 1999 President Clinton pledged that
the United States would "henceforth implement its health care and trade policies in a man-
ner that ensures that people in the poorest countries won't have to go without medicine
they so desperately need." Id.
331. See Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley. supra note 91. at At. Ah. See also ilV/
AIDS: Bush to Keep Intellectual Property Policy. Asu-iu-,, Hi %xiiii Limi. Feb. 22. 2001
(indicating that the Bush administration will uphold the executive order issued by the Clin-
ton administration the previous year).
332. Sternberg, supra note 296. Alan Holmer. President of PhrMA. criticuled the ex-
ecutive order as discriminating against intellectual property laws. hI. PhrMA asserts that
while AIDs is a problem weakening intellectual property is not the solution. Id.
333. See Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley. supra note 91, at AI. Ab: Keeton. supra
note 302: Press Release. Joint MSF/Oxfam. 29 Drug Companies versus South Africa. sttpra
note 312. See also Companies Agree to Cut Prices of HIV Drugs in Poor Vartions. supra
note 299 (noting that the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America de-
nounced the Executive Order as setting an undesirable and inappropriate precedent al-
lowing for exceptions to pharmaceutical patents).
334. See Cooper, Zimmerman & McGinley. supra note 91. at Al. A6.
335. Open Letter to Commissioner Pascal Lanv. supra note 296.
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can High Court, Judge President Bernard decided to permit an amicus
curiae brief submitted by a South African NGO, Treatment Action Cam-
paign (TAG), which represents people living with HIV.336 TAC represen-
tative Axckie Achmat stated that "The exorbitant prices of medicines in
South Africa cannot be justified by the need to finance R&D, given that
Africa comprises only 1% of global pharmaceutical sales.133 7 Allowing
the TAC application indicated that the Judge President believed that peo-
ple infected with AIDS had a compelling interest in the case and in the
matter of access to affordable medicines. 38 The pharmaceutical industry
had tried to prevent the amicus brief from being admitted into evidence
as the brief gives evidence that for the vast majority of people with HIV
in South Africa, brand name medicines are unaffordable.339 Addition-
ally, it placed the onus on the pharmaceutical industry to justify why their
pharmaceuticals are so expensive and their patents are protected so vig-
orously, when affordable drugs can be produced generically for the mil-
lions of people who are infected with the disease.340 In order to permit
the industry complainants time to reply to the brief, and justify their high
prices, the case was scheduled to resume beginning April 18, 2001.341
Worldwide support poured in against the pharmaceutical industry
suit.34 2 MSF began a worldwide petition calling on the companies to
336. Briefing Paper: The Ins and Outs of the PMA Affidavits: A Summary and Re-
sponse to the Affidavits submitted by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association in
South Africa (April 2001) [hereinafter Briefing Paper: The Ins and Outs of the PMA Affi-
davits], at http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21, 2001) (on file with author);
Press Release, Voices of People Living with HIV to be Heard by South African Court,
supra note 312.
337. Briefing Paper: The Ins and Outs of the PMA Affidavits, supra note 336. See
also Press Release, Voices Around the World Condemn Drug Industry Hypocrisy, supra
note 312 (noting also that the investment into R&D is not primarily for diseases that affect
developing countries).
338. Briefing Paper: The Ins and Outs of the PMA Affidavits, supra note 336.
339. Press Release, Voices of People Living with HIV to be Heard by South African
Court. supra note 312.
340. Id.
341. Id. The pharmaceutical company litigants sought an additional four months,
however the Judge only granted them three weeks to present data justifying their high
prices. Id. See Briefing Paper: The Ins and Outs of the PMA Affidavits, supra note 336.
342. Press Release, Voices Around the World Condemn Drug Industry Hypocrisy,
supra note 312. See PETITION: Drop the Case, supra note 304; Mddecins Sans FrontUres,
"Drop the Case" Global Petition Results: Public Support for South Africa (Apr. 18, 2001),
available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21, 2001) (on file with author).
Political Messages calling for the pharmaceutical companies to withdraw from the suit
came from various countries. Id. Included amongst the political voices calling for with-
drawal from the suit were: The European Parliament in an emergency resolution passed on
March 15, 2001 entitled, Access to Medicines for AIDS Patients in the Third World; Nel-
son Mandela former President of South Africa; Minister of Development, Germany; Prime
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drop the lawsuit.34 3 Over 250,000 people from over 130 countries signed
the petition reflecting the worldwide anger at the hypocrisy of the phar-
maceutical industry.3" On April 19, 2001, in response to the resounding
global denouncement of their lawsuit, the drug companies uncondition-
ally dropped the suit.345 With their withdrawal from the suit, the 1997
Medicines Act took force allowing parallel importation of affordable
medicines and legitimizing the use of quality generic drugs."' This vic-
tory for South Africa also creates a resounding precedent for all develop-
ing countries who need better access to health care.-" 7 The message that
the case sends is that "lives should and can take precedence over pat-
ents," providing a change in the traditional power held by drug compa-
nies over developing countries.348 The change that took place in the
United States government during the buildup to the lawsuit in South Af-
rica must be followed through for all developing countries. Just as public
health and the growing AIDS crisis in South Africa began to influence
discussions on the protection of intellectual property, the USTR must fol-
low and support all developing nations' quest for affordable medicines.
The United States must not only be held accountable to this statement, it
must also apply such leniency to all pharmaceutical patents for diseases
prevalent in developing countries, such as tuberculosis, malaria, and
sleeping sickness.
The Industrialized Nations and their pharmaceutical industries must
not ignore the needs of developing countries that suffer from infectious
diseases. Africa may have the highest proportion of people infected with
Minister of Denmark: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark; Prime Minister of the Nether-
lands: Minister of Development Aid, the Netherlands; La Ministre Federale de la Sant6
Publique, Belgium: Le Secretaire d'Etat i la Coopration au Developpement. Belgium.
Id. Additionally, Gro Harlem Brundtland. Director General of the World Health Orgam-
zation sent a political message supporting the South African government's effort to im-
prove access to essential medicines. Id. Support came from over 132 countries and 131
non-governmental organizations. Id.
343. PETITION: Drop the Case, supra note 304 (calling on the 39 pharmaceutical
companies to withdraw from the case blocking the implementation of the legislative Act).
See Press Release. Voices Around the World Condemn Drug Industry Hypocrisy. supra
note 312.
344. Press Release, Voices Around the World Condemn Drug Industry Hypocrtsy.
supra note 312 (noting that the industry claims to be fighting AIDS yet sought to under-
mine South Africa's efforts to provide affordable medicines).
345. Press Release, Joint MSF-Oxfam-TAC. Drug Companies in South Africa Capitu-
late Under Barrage of Public Pressure: Powerful Precedent Set for Other Developing
Countries (Apr. 19, 2001). available at http:/lww.accessmed-msf.org (last visited May 21,





AIDS, but the disease is equally as harmful to people in many other de-
veloping countries.3 9 India has reported at least four million infected
people, but that number may be up to five times higher when considering
non-reported cases.35 ° After sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean has the
highest rate of HIV infection.35' While AIDS is considered a managea-
ble disease in the industrialized world, the cost of AIDS drugs in the de-
veloping world gives the 32.5 million people infected with the disease in
poor countries less chance of survival.352 This should not be the case for
anyone in the world today. Drug therapies exist to battle the spread of
the disease.
Brazil is one country that has put the needs of its AIDS infected people
above the patents required by the pharmaceutical industry.353 Through
Brazil's use of compulsory licenses, the government makes generic copies
of brand name drugs, reducing the cost of medicines by 79%.354 There is
no need to keep the necessary medicines out of the reach of the poor
nations, and allowing the manufacture of cheaper medicines should not
be barred simply because wealthy nations insist on intellectual property
protection. Countries should be encouraged to follow Brazil's model and
should welcome Brazil's offer to transfer its technology to other develop-
ing countries. 355
The offers of the pharmaceutical industry to lower drug prices are lim-
ited and do not do enough to ensure AIDS drugs are affordable.356 De-
veloping countries must reject patents on pharmaceutical products in
order to save their people from infectious diseases.357 While AIDS has
received the most press coverage, developing countries are affected by
numerous infectious diseases that must be countered.358 Cost should not
be a factor in determining whether a person lives or dies. Fear of sanc-
tions on trade from industrialized countries must not be allowed to pre-
349. See Rosenberg, supra note 219.
350. Id.
351. Id. In the Caribbean, more than one in 50 adults are infected and the disease is
spread primarily through heterosexual contact. Id.
352. Id.
353. See id. Brazil introduced triple therapy cocktails of antiretrovirals, used in many
industrialized countries, in order to prevent the climbing AIDS death rate. Id.
354. Id. Notably the AIDS death rate in Brazil has been cut by 50%. Id.
355. See id. Some assert that Brazil's program may not be easily duplicated by all
developing nations, which may not have the advantages of Brazil. Id. However millions of
people live in countries that can emulate Brazil and create an AIDS infrastructure with the
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vent developing countries from taking action to ensure access to essential
medicines.
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN: APPROACHIN; THE END of; tHE
TRANSITION PERIOD
Now is the time to make access to essential medicines affordable. No-
tably, "[i]n the world's poorest countries, most people, particularly the
poor, have to pay for health care from their own pockets at the very time
they are sick and most in need of it." '59 This is especially relevant in light
of the fact that according to the WHO, people in developing countries are
now confronting both the imminent threat of infectious diseases and
overwhelming epidemics of non-contagious diseases.'' Although the
United States is now taking some steps to consider the global AIDS cri-
sis,36 1 these actions are merely small measures in the face of a tremen-
dous problem that encompasses more than just South Africa, and more
than just AIDS.
The TRIPs agreement was included in the last round of GAIT negotia-
tions, and many developing countries are now bound to it in order to
remain members of the WTO. By the year 2006, all developing countries
are expected to have implemented the TRIPs Agreement into their own
national legislation. Where previously developing countries were able to
exclude pharmaceuticals from patent provisions, under the TRIPs WTO
countries must impose both process and product patents for all
pharmaceuticals.3 62 This will be a crushing blow to developing countries
unless the industrialized countries consider the alternatives that are avail-
able. Developed nations must work with developing countries which
have difficulty in complying with the provisions of TRIPs. 6 In the dis-
359. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD H-ALni RtuioRI 20110 HI .Lt
SYSTEMS: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE XViii (2000) [hereinafter WORLD HrAi Iit RI P(JRI
2000].
360. See Fidler, supra note 19, at 191. Non-contagious diseases include heart and lung
diseases. Id.
361. See Press Release. Office of the United States Trade Representative. USTR Bar-
shefsky Welcomes HIV/AIDS Executive Order. supra note 329: Press Release. Office of
the United States Trade Representative. The Protection of Intellectual Property and
Health Policy, supra note 90. See also Cooper. Zimmerman & McGinley. supra note 9l. at
Al. A6.
362. See TRIPs Agreement. supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 155, art.
27. Elliott, supra note 58. at All: Rosenberg. supra note 219: Inphcation5 of Uruguas
Round, supra note 7.
363. See Daniel Pruzin. WTO Members Approve lWork Program For Addressing hn-
plementation Issues, Bureau of National Affairs. Inc.. Washington D.C. (Jun. 23. 20001)
(noting that assistance is particularly needed for those countries who have financial diffi-
culties in creating an intellectual property infrastructure), available at http:/
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cussion of implementation of TRIPs there is a need for the inclusion of
special and more flexible provisions for developing countries, particularly
as it translates into protecting public health.3" The TRIPs agreement
must find a better balance between rich and poor countries.365
A. Amend or Modify the TRIPs Agreement to Provide Implementing
Assistance
Under Article 71 of the Agreement, the TRIPs Council may begin a
review in the event of new developments which might justify modifica-
tions."' As the TRIPs Agreement currently is interpreted, the industrial-
ized countries reap the most benefits from patent protection for
pharmaceuticals. By amending the agreement, a more equitable result
could be achieved. Two areas are in need of immediate change: first the
current twenty year patent term should be decreased; and second the
transition period must be lengthened for developing countries.
1. Decrease the Current 20 Year Patent Term
Decreasing the current 20 year patent term required for pharmaceuti-
cals patents would eliminate a barrier against developing countries.367 It
is solely in the interest of the pharmaceutical corporations ability to make
profits that the 20 year patent requirement is imposed on developing
www.wtowatch.org/news/index.cfm?ID=2106 (lasted visited Sept. 30, 2000) (on file with
author).
364. See id. At a special session of the WTO's General Council on July 3, in Geneva,
trade officials from developing countries argued that "the technical, administrative, and
financial problems they face in implementing and complying with existing WTO Agree-
ments; should be addressed before members can consider negotiations in new trade
round." Id. Particularly the developing nations are calling for the implementation of nu-
merous issues raised by a number of developing countries in a draft of W'TO's ministerial
text. Id. Paragraph 21 calls for the immediate addition of special and more flexible provi-
sions for developing countries to WTO agreements in numerous areas, including TRIPs.
Id. Paragraph 22 calls for a full and comprehensive review of the problems faced by mem-
bers in implementing existing WTO agreements. Id. See TRIPs Under Scrutiny at WTO,
THE HINDU, Oct. 18, 2000.
365. See TRIPs Under Scrutiny at WTO, supra note 364. See also Rowe, supra note
254, at 142 ("[tlhe voices of developing nations should not be muted by the chatter of the
TRIPs Agreement").
366. See McCabe, supra note 9, at 63.
367. See Raghav Narsalay, India: Evolving a WTO Regime- India's Agenda, BusiNEss
LINE, Aug. 10, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24947965; Patents: Private Rights and Public
Interests, supra note 124. Cf. Weissman, supra note 10, at 1073 (introducing the fact that
there is no inherent reason to prevent shortening the period of patent protection).
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countries.368 Such a requirement prevents generic drugs, which could be
produced and sold at a fraction of the price, from being made available to
the poor and needy in developing countries. 369 The current 20 year term
imposes a significant restriction on developing countries and must be
lifted to provide some leniency to developing countries.
2. Increase the Transition Period
Countries should advocate for increasing the transition period estab-
lished for implementing the TRIPs requirements.7 0  While developed
countries were required to meet the obligations of TRIPs by 1996, devel-
oping countries, which have not previously provided protection to
pharmaceuticals, were given until January 2005 to implement the mea-
surements. 71 They need more time to comply with the rules on intellec-
tual property and advocate change and more compassion on the need to
ease drug patents for poorer countries. 37 2 Developing countries are skep-
tical whether the benefits of the Uruguay round are reaching them.
While some developing countries have scrambled to make their patent
laws TRIPs compliant, in order to prevent potential sanctions on their
trade exports, this has proved to be to the detriment of the poor who will
be unable to afford essential drugs:"'
B. Health and Essential Medicines Should Be Basic Human Rights
Many human rights activists assert that the TRIPs provisions on the
patenting of pharmaceuticals violates basic human rights by compromis-
368. See Madeleine Bunting. The Profits that Kill: Dying for Drugs: Intellctual Prop-
erty Agreements Are Making Too Much Mone) for the West. Tr-it GtRDI A\ .Feb. 12. 2U01.
p. 19.
369. See id
370. See Narsalay. supra note 367.
371. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 32. art. 65. 6b.
See Mike Moore, WTO Director General. Yes, Drugs for the Poor-and Patents (is Well,
supra note 223: Implications of Uruguay Round. supra note 7: Kamal. supra note 32.
372. See Optimism About Malaria Vaccine Grows. supra note 267.
373. See Judith Achieng', Health Trade-Kenya: New Patenting Law Mats Be tlarmnid
to Health, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 18. 1999. Kenya. for example, introduced a bill
bringing its legislation in line with the TRIPs requirements, but such legislation failed to
provide safeguards for national health emergencies. Id. By imposing TRIPs compliant
legislation multinational pharmaceutical companies will attain a monopoly on pharmaceu-
tical prices thus driving the cost of drugs out of the reach of the poor. i. MSF has urged
Kenya to legislate compulsory licensing and parallel imports for medicines before enacting
TRIPs compliant legislation. Id. See also Kenya Seeks Legal Path to Cheaper AIDS Drugs.
AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 6. 2001 (noting that Kenya has now; introduced plans to
relax its stringent patent laws by introducing a bill to legalize parallel imports).
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ing the ability of poor countries to access essential medicines.374 Notably,
in August of 2000, the WTO was indicted by a United Nations panel for
failing to respect human rights in the implementation of TRIPs.375 This
failure to respect human rights has resulted in making necessary
medicines for deadly diseases unaffordable to poor nations.376
When developing countries agreed to sign on to the TRIPs, despite
many objections, they did so because of various provisions that were
meant to reflect the needs of their countries. 377 Article 8 of the TRIPs,
which promises to protect public health, is one such provision.37 8 Article
8 should be utilized to demand that as there is an essential right to health,
and thus essential medicines should be made available, regardless of pat-
ent laws.379 Additionally, Article 27 of the Agreement contains a public
health exception to the patent requirement which includes the protection
of human life or health.38° This public health exception should allow
countries with legitimate health concerns to deny a patent on a particular
drug or all drugs.381 Taken together Article 8 and Article 27 must be
used to protect the health needs of developing countries. This view was
reinforced by the WHO in its Revised Drug Strategy, which urged Mem-
374. See Fidler, supra note 19, at 214; D. Ravi Kanth, WTO Allowed Drugs to be
Priced Beyond Reach of the Poor: UN Panel, BUSINESS TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, available at
2000 WL 25565053.
375. See Kanth, supra note 374. The UN Commission on Human Rights created a
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Id.
376. See id. The pharmaceutical companies continue to assert that because they spend
millions conducting R&D, they have the right to charge prices they deem as suitable. Id.
377. See Implications of Uruguay Round, supra note 7. The TRIPs Agreement pro-
vides an exception to product and process patents for inventions that may be contrary to
public order or morality, allowing developing countries an exclusion from patentability.
See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 155, art 27 (2). See
also TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra notes 164 & 166 (detail-
ing the provisions surrounding compulsory licenses and parallel imports).
378. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7, art. 8. "Members may... adopt measures nec-
essary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors
of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development . . ." Id.
379. See id.
380. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7 and text accompanying supra note 155, art.
27(2). See Weissman, supra note 10, at 1099.
381. See Weissman, supra note 10. at 1099-1100. The way the Article is written re-
quires that the patent exception be linked to a prohibition against commercial exploitation
of the invention. See id. at 1100. This linkage limits the scope of the exception, particularly
as it applies to generic companies. Id. However it does provide an alternative to develop-
ing countries. Id. Additionally, the requirement of what constitutes "necessary" would
present a hurdle that developed countries would likely attempt to use against the develop-
ing countries. See id. at 1101, 1106. It is likely that a developing country attempting to
invoke the exception would have to argue that there are no means less inconsistent with
the Agreement to achieve the goal of providing access to essential medicines. Id. at 1106.
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ber States to ensure equitable access to essential drugs.3" 2 The TRIPs
Agreement should not act as an impediment to the public health of peo-
ple in developing countries. Rather, to be consistent with Article 8 of
TRIPs and the goals of WHO as specified in the Strategy, the priority
must be placed in the health and well being of all the world's people.
1. Parallel Imports and Compulsory Licenses
Making essential health needs a basic human right can be done in a
manner consistent with the TRIPs. In developing countries where a ma-
jority of people live below the poverty line, it is inexcusable to demand
that those people pay the exorbitant costs associated with patented
drugs.383 When the choice is between making profits or saving lives, the
choice should be simple. If the goal is truly to help developing nations
develop, patent laws that inhibit the health of nations should not be a
priority when there is a cheaper alternative available.- ' Exceptions to
patent protection on pharmaceuticals for essential medicines, can be con-
sidered consistent with TRIPs provisions on parallel imports and compul-
sory licenses. The WTO must clarify the rules as provided for in TRIPs
to give developing countries the undeniable right to compulsory licenses
and parallel imports for essential pharmaceuticals. 5
a. Parallel Imports
Once a country has sold a product to another country, it has received
the benefit of its patent and its rights to that product are thus exhausted.
If the country that bought the product then chooses to sell the product at
a lower price no harm has been done to the patent holder.
During the Uruguay Round the issue of exhaustion of patent rights was
not addressed in the text of the Agreement." ° Recently this has been
clarified by the WTO. According to WTO General Director Mike
Moore, if a government authorizes parallel imports of a drug from coun-
382. See WHA 52.19. Revised Drug Strategy, supra note 30. The strategy stated spe-
cifically that Member States should "explore and review their options under relevant inter-
national agreements, including trade agreements, to safeguard access to essential drugs."
Id.
383. See id. (urging Member States to safeguard access to essential drugs).
384. See Elliott, supra note 58. at All. No one should die because they could not
afford the medications to treat their illnesses. See id. Developing countries should be al-
lowed to make cheap copies of western drugs. such as in the case of India, who makes 70%
of its own drugs. Id. Those poorer developing countries who cannot afford to manufacture
their own drugs should be allowed to benefit by importing the cheaper generic versions in
order to ensure access to essential medicines. See id.
385. See id.
386. See Implications of Uruguay Round. supra note 7.
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tries where the drug is available at a cheaper price, that authorization
cannot be challenged at the WTO.3 87 The South African example illus-
trates that the use of parallel imports does not violate international law
but allows a country to act in a manner consistent with their TRIPs
obligations. 88
b. Compulsory Licenses
Compulsory licenses allow a local pharmaceutical company to manu-
facture generic copies of patented pharmaceuticals at lower prices by
forcing multinational corporations to issue a license in exchange for a
reasonable royalty.389 Compulsory licenses should be permitted for pub-
lic interest in order to prevent the establishment of barriers to the attain-
ment of basic health care needs.390
While compulsory licensing might appear an easy solution, industrial-
ized countries and their pharmaceutical industries are hesitant to allow
them for pharmaceutical products.391 Developing countries that have at-
387. Mike Moore, WTO Director General, Yes, Drugs for the Poor-and Patents as
Well, supra note 223.
388. Cf. Snyder, supra note 227, at 198 (explaining that South Africa's legislation per-
mitting parallel imports is TRIPs compliant).
389. See Rosenberg, supra note 219. See also Achieng', supra note 373; Patents: Pri-
vate Rights and Public Interests, supra note 124 (noting that the royalty is fixed according to
an inventor's contribution).
390. See Patents: Private Rights and Public Interests, supra note 124. See also Wechkin,
supra note 38, at 240 (providing that compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical inventions
were once viewed as legitimate, in light of the fact that the cost of developing pharmaceuti-
cals in developing countries was often prohibitive and the license provided a means by
which the technological pharmaceutical industry could be developed without the ordinary
expense); Implications of Uruguay Round, supra note 7 (arguing the compulsory licensing
provisions of TRIPs are excessively restrictive, by not allowing a country to discriminate as
to whether a product is imported or locally produced and that the failure to meet the needs
of a market should provide a basis for extending a compulsory license).
391. See Rosenberg, supra note 219. "Of all the tools available to poor countries,
compulsory licensing is what the drug companies fear the most, since it represents the most
direct assault on control of their patents." Id. Notably the United States issues compul-
sory licenses for items that it feels are important, though generally less life threatening
than disease. Id. The U.S. has issued compulsory licenses in many anti-trust cases, for tow
trucks, stainless steel wheels and corn seeds. Id. See also Fisch, supra note 68, at 300-01 &
n35. In the United States compulsory licenses are rarely found. Id. There are a few excep-
tions that exist such as in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act 42 U.S.C. § 2183(g)
(1994), the Plant Variety Protection Act 7 U.S.C. § 231 (1994) and the Clean Air Act 28
U.S.C. §§ 1857(h)(6), 7608 (1994). Id. Thus if the compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals
was allowed it would add to one of the limited exceptions to United States patent law. See
id. Cf. McCabe, supra note 9, at 61 (asserting that developed countries will likely reject
compulsory licensing as a valid option, as one of their goals in the negotiation of TRIPs
was to restrict the application of compulsory licenses).
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tempted to institute compulsory licenses, in accordance with the national
emergency exception in Article 31 of TRIPs, are faced with pressure from
the pharmaceutical industry and developing countries.3' This pressure
must stop. This alternative should be utilized without fear of reprisals."'
The need for access to infectious disease therapies in the developing
world should take priority over the industrialized world pharmaceutical
industry's desire to protect their patents. The health crises in developing
countries constitute national emergencies. If a country chooses to in-
fringe on a patent by issuing a compulsory license in order to cope with a
national emergency, the burden of proof should be on the patent holder
to prove that there is no emergency. 3 At a minimum, industrialized
companies must take steps to ensure that developing countries are not
forced to ignore the health needs of its people because of threat of sanc-
tions against countries that use compulsory licensing or parallel
imports.395
The TRIPs allows countries facing health emergencies to void patents
through compulsory licenses and create their own generic versions, phar-
maceutical companies must not be allowed to dictate whether a develop-
ing country chooses to utilize that option.3 9 0
C. Help Developing Countries Develop: Allow Work Requirements on
Pharmaceutical Patents
Prior to the TRIPs Agreement many developing countries imposed a
work requirement that required an invention to be manufactured domes-
tically to receive patent protection. 397 For a patented invention that was
manufactured outside of the developing country to receive patent protec-
tion within the country, a petition would have to be filed, requesting a
license from the government to manufacture the invention domesti-
cally.398 Article 27(1) of the TRIPs Agreement provides that patents
should be enjoyable whether the products are locally produced or im-
ported.399 This provision has banned work requirements. In developing
392. Rosenberg. supra note 219.
393. See Fidler, supra note 19. at 210.
394. See Elliott. supra note 58. at All.
395. See Rosenberg, supra note 219.
396. See Donald G. McNeil Jr.. Patent Holders Fight Proposal on Generic AIDS
Drugs for Poor. N.Y. TiNiEs. May 18. 2000. at A5.
397. See McCabe. supra note 9. at 61. See also Weissman. supra note 10. at 1074 (im-
posing a requirement that a patent holder **work the patent" in the country where the
patent is held).
398. See McCabe, supra note 9. at 62. See. eg.. Gutterman, supra note 42. at 114-15
(showing that Argentina had a requirement that required local production or procesmng to
occur within two years of issuance of the patent or it would lapse).
399. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 7. art. 27. See McCabe. supra note 9. at 62
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countries with large poverty-stricken populations, requiring domestic
manufacture is not unreasonable. While developed countries might pro-
test against modifying Article 27,400 the need for developing countries to
facilitate their own economic growth and investment requires that domes-
tic work requirements be reinstated and the restrictive language of Arti-
cle 27 be deleted. This requirement need not be seen as a preventing
foreign corporations from obtaining patents, rather it should be viewed as
providing the brand name pharmaceutical companies the opportunity to
invest in developing countries by opening manufacturing facilities in
those countries.
D. Elimination of Unilateral Sanctions by the United States
The DSB of the WTO/GATT may not be the ideal system for enforce-
ment of intellectual property laws, but at least it is facially neutral. The
United States should not be allowed to act as the police officer for intel-
lectual property through the use of its Special 301 laws.4" 1 While the
United States claims that they amended Special 301 to ensure that the
measure would not conflict with TRIPs and the DSB, the unilateral na-
ture of 301 appears to be in bad faith with the WTO. Numerous coun-
tries have been placed on the USTR's Special 301 Watch list for not
issuing pharmaceutical patents.40 2 Countries are afraid of retaliation by
not issuing patents as such actions discourage investment and thus act as
a sanction.4 °3 The United States attempts to foster more protection for
intellectual property protection than even TRIPs requires. 4" The United
States TRIPs plus approach has no justification for enforcement in inter-
national law. 4 5 Governments must be encouraged to resist unilateral
pressure. Developing nations cannot be expected to trust a system that is
policed solely by the United States.
E. Price Controls
Another alternative is found through a system of differential pricing,
where pharmaceutical companies charge developing countries less than
advanced industrialized countries to ensure that patented technologies
400. See McCabe, supra note 9, at 62.
401. See Rowe, supra note 254, at 115 (warning that the United States' use of Special
301 undermines the provisions of the WTO).
402. Rosenberg, supra note 219.
403. Id.
404. See Vicente, supra note 6, at 1112 (arguing that the United States requires intel-
lectual property protection "greater-than-TRIPs" requires). But see McCabe, supra note 9,
at 62 (explaining that TRIPs only established minimum standards and countries could im-
plement more extensive requirements).
405. M6decins Sans Frontires, Report to Thailand, supra note 22.
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are not priced at unreasonable levels. 4" New Zealand provides an exam-
ple of a country that has tried to comply with the GATF provisions, but
has effected a price control system for pharmaceuticals in order to keep
medicines affordable. 4°7 While this idea is consistent with the TRIPs
agreement and is backed by the WHO. the European Commission and
MSF, many developed countries are hesitant.4" They fear that the low
priced drugs will be re-imported to the industrialized world and consum-
ers in developed countries will not want to pay the higher prices of
pharmaceuticals when low prices are offered elsewhere. ""' In considera-
tion of this fact, proposals to include price control mechanisms will likely
be rejected by industrialized countries. t1
F. Compile a Database of Generic Products
In May of 2000, Brazil provided a proposal to world health authorities
that would benefit developing countries."' The proposal asked that a
database of prices for all AIDS drugs be compiled to allow poor countries
to shop around for the best prices worldwide.4 " Generic drugs made in
countries like Brazil, Thailand and India would be included in the
database allowing countries the right to choose which drugs to acquire."'
This would provide poor countries, who do not have the money, technol-
406. See Mike Moore. WTO Director General. Yes, Drugs for the Poor-and Patents as
Well, supra note 223. See also Weissman. supra note 10. at 1074 (stating that price controls
are common in many industrialized countries and thus should be a viable optionl. Set- e.l.,
Wechkin, supra note 38, at 238. New Zealand is an example of a country that effected
pharmaceutical patents but masked the increases in drug prices by instituting a pharmaceu-
tical price support system. Id. This system provides the potential to shift the issue from
protection of intellectual property to ensuring price regulation allowing the government to
control the price and availability of pharmaceuticals. hI. However. this solution may not
be ideal because price controls, which may work for a developed nation like New Zealand.
may restrain the importation of patented technologies into the developing country. Id.
Without an adequate return on investment, companies will not transfer their latest technol-
ogy to a developing country. Id.
407. See generally Wechkin. supra note 38 (advancing the New Zealand price regula-
tion system as a model for other countries including the United States).
408. See Mike Moore, WTO Director General, Yes, Drugs for the Poor-and Patents as
Well, supra note 223.
409. Id.
410. Cf. McCabe. supra note 9. at 60 (discussing the difficulty of determining what is a
reasonable price): Weissman, supra note 10. at 1115 (expressing the pharmaceutical indus-
tries disdain for price controls).
411. McNeil Jr.. supra note 396. at A5: Brazils AIDS Dng Proposal. Tit PRo%
DENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN. June 21. 2000. at A 1.
412. McNeil Jr.. supra note 396, at A5: Brazil's AIDS Drug Proposal. supra note 411.
at All.
413. See McNeil Jr.. supra note 396. at AS: Brazs AIDS Drug Proposal, supra note
411, at All.
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ogy or infrastructure to develop their own generic versions of drugs, ac-
cess to affordable medicines.414 This proposal should be adopted for all
essential medicines and made available to all developing countries.
Countries should be able to shop around for the best price.
4 15
While the large pharmaceutical companies feel that such a database
would encourage countries to disregard drug patents,416 ensuring access
to essential medicines should be a priority for all countries. The major
American and European pharmaceutical manufacturers argue against
such a proposal and assert that only patent holders should have the right
to manufacture and sell the drugs they created, to recover R&D costs.
4 17
They assert that if patents are protected they will offer discounted prices
to developing countries, as was done in early May, 2000.418 This disre-
gards the fact that even the lower prices offered are still more expensive
than generic prices and the conditions attached to the lower prices could
not be reasonably met by many developing countries.4 19
Further, the large pharmaceutical manufactures assert that such a
database would not ensure the safety of all the drugs listed and that the
WHO does not have the money to test them.42° However, if the devel-
oped world, the WHO and the United Nations work together, testing the
quality of drugs provided on the list could ensure their safety. Addition-
ally, providing a price list, does not necessarily guarantee that a country
would take the cheapest option, and countries could list on the database
whether a drug had met certain safety standards as established by the
WHO. Such a remedy is necessary in the face of the serious poverty and
poor health that many developing countries face. The violation of pat-
ents should not be a concern when people's health is in question. 42 The
WHO must be made to facilitate such programs.422
In the early 1980s UNICEF began a campaign to vaccinate the world's
children. 423 Today, UNICEF's global vaccination system has an 80% suc-
cess rate saving millions of lives each year and preventing debilitating
414. See McNeil Jr., supra note 396, at A5.
415. See id. (noting that MSF and ACT UP activists strongly support the Brazilian
initiative); Brazil's AIDS Drug Proposal, supra note 411, at All.
416. See McNeil Jr., supra note 396, at A5; Brazil's AIDS Drug Proposal, supra note
411, at All.
417. See McNeil Jr., supra note 396, at A5; Brazil's AIDS Drug Proposal. supra note
411, at All.
418. See McNeil Jr., supra note 396, at A5; Brazil's AIDS Drug Proposal, supra note
411, at All.
419. See Brazil's AIDS Drug Proposal, supra note 411, at All.
420. See McNeil Jr., supra note 396, at A5.
421. Brazil's AIDS Drug Proposal, supra note 411, at All.
422. See Rosenberg, supra note 219.
423. See id.
[Vol. 3:339
2001] EXAMINATION OF THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 411
diseases.4 24 If the WHO could adopt a system like UNICEF and provide
lists of reliable generic suppliers, access to essential medicines would
greatly increase for the world's poor. Such a program would likely im-
pose a higher cost on the developed world but the lives that would be
saved should outweigh that price.
VII. CONCLUSION
In its 1999 World Health Report, the WHO recognized that reducing
the burden of disease suffered by the poor is not just a burden that gov-
ernments must face.4 1 The Director General, Dr. Gro Harlem Brund-
tland, noted that to make real inroads into resolving poverty requires the
collective resources and energy of civil society and the private sector in
addition to assistance from governments. 426 Access to affordable
medicines should be a priority for the government of any country, partic-
ularly when the issue is the price of a medicine versus the price of a
human life.427 The intangible rights of intellectual property pale in com-
parison to the need to provide access to essential medicines in developing
countries. This is particularly the case in light of the spread of infectious
diseases, and also the increase in non-communicable diseases. The health
gap that exists between developed and developing countries will only
continue to escalate if patent protection of pharmaceuticals is an abso-
lute. To reject the truth of this view would be to subject developing na-
tions to the whim of industrialized nations.
Attempting to enforce intellectual property in the area of pharmaceuti-
cal patents, as it currently exists, would perpetuate a regeneration of colo-
nialist politics in which the industrialized countries control the economic
future of the developing nations by allocating technology and extracting
exorbitant royalties in return. Additionally, developed nations and multi-
lateral institutions have an obligation to aid the development of poorer
countries rather than retard their growth through restrictive intellectual
property policies. 4" The health gap is increasingly widening, as evi-
denced by the difference in death rates and life expectancy between rich
and poor countries.429 This review of India is merely one example of a
424. Id.
425. WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999, supra note 19, at x.
426. Id.
427. See Boseley, supra note 147.
428. WHA 52.23. Strengthening Health, supra note 22 (requesting that developed
countries, the international community and multilateral institutions should constder the
health needs in developing countries and "maintain a people-centered focus in their delib-
erations, particularly where such deliberations could impact negatively on the health status
of the most vulnerable").
429. See WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000. supra note 359, at xii.
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developing country fighting for the welfare of its people. Prohibiting ac-
cess to essential medicines affects all developing countries, and providing
exceptions for countries on a case by case basis, such as was the case with
South Africa, is not a sufficient resolution. The exception provided for
South Africa, in the wake of grand scale media attention, should be ap-
plied to all developing countries.
The World Health Assembly has reiterated that a country has the sov-
ereign right to adopt national policies specific to the needs of its peo-
ple.43° The governments of the world must come together to see that the
benefits accrued to inventors from patent protection of pharmaceuticals
is insignificant to the specific need of protecting life. The benefits for
some should not impose suffering on others. Unfortunately, without a
significant change in the way the industrialized world enforces patent
protection of pharmaceuticals, people in the developing countries will
continue to face suffering and an innumerable amount of deaths. This
suffering and death can be greatly reduced. The world, this time led by
the industrialized nations, must choose to make a difference.
We can make a difference. Those of us who commit our lives to im-
proving health can help to make sure that hope will predominate over
uncertainty in the century to come. Human health - and its influence
on every aspect of life - is central to the larger picture.431
430. WHA 52.23, Strengthening Health, supra note 22.
431. WORLD HEALTH RE'ORT 1999, supra note 19, at vii (emphasis added).
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